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THE FAN THEOREM, ITS STRONG NEGATION, AND THE
DETERMINACY OF GAMES
WIM VELDMAN
Abstract. In the context of a weak formal theory called Basic Intuitionistic
Mathematics BIM, we study Brouwer’s Fan Theorem and a strong negation of
the Fan Theorem, Kleene’s Alternative (to the Fan Theorem). We prove that
the Fan Theorem is equivalent to contrapositions of a number of intuition-
istically accepted axioms of countable choice and that Kleene’s Alternative
is equivalent to strong negations of these statements. We also discuss finite
and infinite games and introduce a constructively useful notion of determinacy.
We prove that the Fan Theorem is equivalent to the Intuitionistic Determinacy
Theorem, saying that every subset of Cantor space is, in our constructively
meaningful sense, determinate, and show that Kleene’s Alternative is equiva-
lent to a strong negation of a special case of this theorem. We then consider a
uniform intermediate value theorem and a compactness theorem for classical
propositional logic, and prove that the Fan Theorem is equivalent to each of
these theorems and that Kleene’s Alternative is equivalent to strong negations
of them. We end with a note on a possibly important statement, provable from
principles accepted by Brouwer, that one might call a Strong Fan Theorem.
The paper is a sequel to [40].
1. Introduction
1.1. Intuitionistic reverse mathematics. L.E.J. Brouwer did not present his
intuitionistic mathematics as a formal axiomatic theory. He did not like formalism
and formalization and anxiously maintained the distinction between a mathematical
proof and the linguistic expression that should help us to recover the proof but may
fail to do so. The challenge to develop formal theories coming close to Brouwer’s
intentions was taken up by by A. Heyting, G. Gentzen, S.C. Kleene, G. Kreisel,
J. Myhill, A.S. Troelstra, and others.
Given a preferably weak formal basic theory Γ and a formal proof in Γ of a
statement T from some extra assumption A, one may ask: is there also a formal
proof in Γ of this extra assumption A from the statement T ? The study of such
questions, as far as they belong to the field of classical analysis or second-order
arithmetic, is called reverse mathematics, see [23]. The weak basic theory there is
RCA0.
Our subject is intuitionistic reverse mathematics.
The weak basic theory we use is the two-sorted first-order intuitionistic the-
ory BIM (Basic Intuitionistic Mathematics), introduced in [40]. The domain of
discourse of BIM consists of two kinds of objects: natural numbers and infinite
sequences of natural numbers. The axioms express some basic assumptions like the
(full) principle of induction on N, and the fact that the set of the infinite sequences
of natural numbers is closed under the recursion-theoretic operations.
The reason that we use a basic theory different in spirit from the basic theory
used in classical reverse mathematics is that, in intuitionistic analysis, one prefers
the notion of an infinite sequence of natural numbers as a primitive notion above
the notion of a subset of the set of the natural numbers, see [40, Section 5].
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Our choice of a different basic theory makes it somewhat difficult to compare our
results with the results of classical reverse mathematics, although there are strong
parallels.
For the intuitionistic mathematician, the setN of all infinite sequences of natural
numbers is not, as one sometimes says when explaining the notion of ‘set’ that lies at
the basis of classical set theory, the result of taking together the earlier constructed
and completed items that are to be the “elements” of the set. The set N is a realm
of possibilities: it is a framework for constructing, in the future, in all kinds of
possibly as yet unforeseen ways, the objects that will be called the elements of the
set. An infinite sequence α =
(
α(0), α(1), . . .
)
of natural numbers, sometimes is the
result of executing a program, a finitely formulated algorithm, but it may also be
the result of a more or less free step-by-step construction that is not governed by a
rule formulated at the start of the process.
The axioms of BIM hold for their intended interpretation, the interpretation
given to them by the intuitionistic mathematician. The axioms also become true
for the intuitionistic mathematician if he assumes that the elements of N are just
the Turing-computable functions from N to N. As Turing-computable functions
may be represented by the natural number coding their program, BIM may be seen
to be a conservative extension of first-order intuitionistic arithmetic HA, Heyting
arithmetic. The model given by the computable functions is the second interpreta-
tion of BIM. Our study of this model is a contribution to intuitionistic recursive
analysis.
In the weak context given by BIM one may study Brouwer’s further axioms.
They fall into three groups:
(1) Axioms of Countable Choice,
(2) Brouwer’s Continuity Principle and the Axioms of Continuous Choice, and
(3) Brouwer’s Thesis on bars in Baire space N and the Fan Theorem.
The intuitionistic mathematican assumes that these axioms hold in the intended
interpretation and is prepared to argue their plausibility.
He defends the Axioms of Countable Choice, for instance, by explaining that the
functions promised by the axioms may be constructed step by step.
He has no argument for the truth of Brouwer’s further axioms under the second
interpretation, where every function is assumed to be given by an algorithm. It is
not clear to him if the Axioms of Countable Choice then are true.
Brouwer’s Continuity Principle and its extensions, the Axioms of Continuous
Choice, certainly fail in the second interpretation.
The Thesis on bars in N was introduced by Brouwer for the sake of the Fan
Theorem. The Fan Theorem itself, dating from 1924, see [5], might be called the
Thesis on Bars in Cantor space C, see [36], [37], and [40, Subsection 2.3].
In 1952, Kleene saw that, in our second interpretation, also the Fan Theorem,
and, a fortiori, the Thesis on bars in N , do not hold. Actually, a positively for-
mulated strong negation of the Fan Theorem becomes true. In [40], we called this
statement Kleene’s Alternative (to the Fan Theorem).
As in [39] and [40], it is our aim, in this paper, to find statements that are, in
BIM, equivalent to either the Fan Theorem itself, or to this strong negation of the
Fan Theorem.
If we call a statement B the strong negation of a statement A, B will be a posi-
tively formulated statement that constructively implies the negation of A. There is
not always a unique candidate for such a strong negation and we do not introduce
strong negation as a syntactical operation on formulas. It is important to realize
that, once we have understood that statement A is equivalent to statement B, it is
often far from obvious and may be even wrong to conclude that statements C,D,
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which have been chosen to be called the strong negations of A,B, respectively, also
are equivalent.
If we have decided to call the formula (denoted by) B the strong negation of the
formula (denoted by) A, we will write B = ¬!A, but note that this notation belongs
to the meta-language of BIM. ¬! is not a connective belonging to the language of
BIM.
In spite of the warning we just gave, we will prove a number of results of the
form:
In BIM, A is equivalent to B and ¬!B is equivalent to ¬!A.
If possible, we have done our best, in such cases, to make clear that the conclu-
sions A→ B and ¬!B → ¬!A have a common ground and that also the conclusions
B → A and ¬!A→ ¬!B have a common ground.
We give some attention to statements that fail in both our models, like Weak
Ko¨nig’s Lemma, and Bishop’s Omniscience Principles. This will help us see that
certain other statements, being equivalent, in BIM, to one of them, also do not
make sense in either one of our two interpretations.
1.2. The contents of the paper. Apart from this introduction, the paper con-
tains Sections 2-12.
Section 2 is divided into three Subsections. In Subsection 2.1 we introduce
the formal system BIM. Subsection 2.2 contains a list of defined notions. This
Subsection may be used as a reference by the reader of the following Sections.
Subsection 2.3 lists a number of assumptions one might study in the context of
BIM.
In Section 3 we prove that, in BIM, the Σ01-Separation Principle Σ
0
1-Sep is
equivalent to Weak Ko¨nig’s Lemma WKL.
In Section 4 we formulate some special cases of the First Axiom of Choice ACω,ω,
among them Π01-ACω,2, the Π
0
1-Axiom of Countable Binary Choice.
In Section 5 we introduce Σ01-
←−−−−
ACω,2, a contraposition of Π
0
1-ACω,2, and we
prove: in BIM, Σ01-
←−−−−
ACω,2 is equivalent to the Fan Theorem FT, and a strong
negation of Σ01-
←−−−−
ACω,2 is equivalent to Kleene’s Alternative ¬!FT.
If we call a postively formulated statement B the contraposition
←−
A of a positively
formulated statement A, the classical mathematician would think
←−
A and A are
equivalent, but, constructively,
←−
A and A will have quite different meanings. We do
not claim that, given a statement A, there always is a unique candidate for being
called the contraposition of A. We do not introduce contraposition as a syntactical
operation on formulas and use the term only in certain specific cases.
We learn from Section 5 that a contraposition of Π01-ACω,2 fails in our second
interpretation, but this gives us no conclusion about the validity ofΠ01-ACω,2 itself
in our second interpretation.
In Section 6 we formulate some special cases of the Second Axiom Scheme of
Countable Choice ACω,N , among them Π
0
1-ACω,C , the Π
0
1-Axiom of Countable
Compact Choice.
In Section 7 we introduce Σ01-
←−−−−
ACω,C , a contraposition of Π
0
1-ACω,C , and we
prove: in BIM, Σ01-
←−−−−
ACω,C is equivalent to FT, and a strong negation of Σ
0
1-
←−−−−
ACω,C
is equivalent to ¬!FT.
In Section 8 we introduce Σ01-
←−−−−
AC2,C , a contraposition of a statement provable
in BIM, to wit, the Π01-“axiom” of Twofold Compact Choice.
We prove: in BIM + Π01-ACω,2, Σ
0
1-
←−−−−
AC2,C is equivalent to FT. There is no
companion result for ¬!FT.
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In Section 9 we consider finite and infinite games. We explain in what sense we
want to call such games I-determinate or II-determinate. We see that Σ01-
←−−−−
ACω,2
can be read as statement that certain 2-move games are I-determinate. We prove:
in BIM, FT is equivalent to the statement that every subset of Cantor space C is
(weakly) I-determinate, and ¬!FT is equivalent to the statement that there exists
an open subset of C that positively fails to be I-determinate.
In Section 10 we consider a Uniform Contrapositive Intermediate Value Theorem
←−−−−
UIVT and we prove: in BIM, FT is equivalent to
←−−−−
UIVT and ¬!FT is equivalent
to a strong negation of
←−−−−
UIVT.
In Section 11 we see that, if one formulates the compactness theorem for classical
propositional logic carefully and contrapositively, one obtains a statement that, in
BIM, is equivalent to FT. ¬!FT is equivalent to a strong negation of this statement.
In Section 12 we ask the reader’s attention for the Approximate-Fan Theorem
AppFT, a statement stronger than FT. We did so already in [40, Subsection 10.2],
see also [41]. AppFT is studied further in [41].
I would like to thank the referees of earlier versions of this paper. Their thorough
comments and criticisms were very useful and led to numerous improvements. The
last referee deserves special mention. He spent a huge amount of energy on the
paper and wrote a very detailed report, making me see how often I expressed
myself wrongly or confusingly, and confronting me with many oversights. I learned
a lot from him.
I also thank U. Kohlenbach for providing some references and for making me
repair a mistaken observation in Section 10.
2. The formal system BIM
2.1. The basic axioms. BIM, introduced in [40, Section 6], has two kinds of
variables, numerical variables m,n, p, . . ., whose intended range is the set N of the
natural numbers, and function variables α, β, γ, . . ., whose intended range is the set
N of all infinite sequences of natural numbers. There is a numerical constant 0.
There are five unary function constants: Id, a name for the identity function, 0, a
name for the zero function, S, a name for the successor function, and K, L, names
for the projection functions. There is one binary function symbol J , a name for the
pairing function on N. From these symbols numerical terms are formed in the usual
way. The basic terms are the numerical variables and the numerical constant and
other terms are obtained from earlier constructed terms by the use of a function
symbol. The function constants Id , 0, S, K and L and the function variables are
the only function terms.
BIN has two equality symbols, =0 and =1. The first symbol may be placed
between numerical terms and the second one between function terms. When confu-
sion seems improbable we simply write = and not =0 or =1. The usual axioms for
equality are part of BIM. A basic formula is an equality between numerical terms
or an equality between function terms. A basic formula in the strict sense is an
equality between numerical terms. We obtain the formulas of the theory from the
basic formulas by using the connectives, the numerical quantifiers and the function
quantifiers.
The logic of the theory is intuitionistic logic.
Our first axiom is
Axiom 1 (Axiom of Extensionality).
∀α∀β[α =1 β ↔ ∀n[α(n) =0 β(n)]]
4
The Axiom of Extensionality guarantees that every formula will be provably
equivalent to a formula built up by means of connectives and quantifiers from basic
formulas in the strict sense.
The second axiom is the axiom on the function constants Id, 0, S, J,K and L.
Axiom 2.
∀n[Id(n) = n] ∧
∀n[¬(S(n) = 0)] ∧ ∀m∀n[S(m) = S(n)→ m = n] ∧
∀n[0(n) = 0] ∧
∀m∀n[K
(
J(m,n)
)
= m ∧ L
(
J(m,n)
)
= n ∧ J
(
K(n), L(n)
)
= n]
Thanks to the presence of the pairing function we may treat binary, ternary and
other non-unary operations on N as unary functions. “α(m,n, p)”, for instance,
will be an abbreviation of “α
(
J(J(m,n), p)
)
”.
We also introduce the following notation: for each n, n′ := K(n) and n′′ := L(n),
and, for all m,n, (m,n) := J(m,n). The last part of Axiom 2 now reads as follows:
∀m∀n[(m,n)′ = m ∧ (m,n)′′ = n ∧ (n′, n′′) = n].
The next axiom1 asks for the closure of the set N under composition, pairing,
primitive recursion and unbounded search.
Axiom 3.
∀α∀β∃γ∀n[γ(n) = α
(
β(n)
)
] ∧
∀α∀β∃γ∀n[γ(n) =
(
α(n), β(n)
)
] ∧
∀α∀β∃γ∀m∀n[γ(m, 0) = α(m) ∧ γ
(
m,S(n)
)
= β
(
m,n, γ(m,n)
)
] ∧
∀α[∀n∃m[α(n,m) = 0]→ ∃γ∀n[α
(
n, γ(n)
)
= 0 ∧ ∀m < γ(n)[α(n,m) 6= 0]]]
We also need the Axiom Scheme of Induction:
Axiom 4.
(P (0) ∧ ∀n[P (n)→ P
(
S(n)
)
])→ ∀n[P (n)]
Instances of this axiom scheme are obtained by substituting a formula
φ = φ(m0,m1, . . . ,mk−1, α0, α1, . . . , αl−1, n) for P and taking the universal closure
of the resulting formula. The reader should understand the further axiom schemes
we are to mention in this paper in the same way.
The axioms 1-4 define the system BIM.
Note that BIM, having the full induction scheme, is rather strong if compared
with RCA0, where one has only Σ
0
1-induction, see [23, Definition II.1.5].
We form a conservative extension of BIM by adding constants for all primitive
recursive functions and relations and making their defining equations into axioms.
Primitive recursive relations are present via their characteristic functions. ‘x < y’,
for instance, will be short for: ‘χ<(x, y) 6= 0’. Somewhat loosely, we also denote
this conservative extension of BIM by the acronym BIM although one might decide
to use the acronym BIM+, see [27].
BIM may be compared to the system H introduced in [9] and to the system
EL occurring in [26]. A precise proof of the fact that BIM and these systems are
essentially equivalent may be found in [27].
2.2. Notations and conventions.
1A referee made us see that this Axiom 3, as formulated in [40], is a little bit too weak.
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2.2.1. Finite and infinite sequences of natural numbers.
BIM contains a constant p denoting the function enumerating the prime numbers:
p(0) = 2, p(1) = 3, . . .
We code finite sequences of natural numbers by natural numbers:
〈 〉 := 0 and, for each k > 0, for all m0,m1, . . .mk−1,
〈m0, . . . ,mk−1〉 = p(k − 1) ·
∏
i<k
p(i)mi − 1
length(0) := 0 and,
for each s > 0, length(s) := 1 + the largest k such that p(k) divides s+ 1.
If i < length(s)− 1, then s(i) := the largest m such that p(i)m divides s+1, and,
if i = length(s)− 1, then s(i) := the largest m such that p(i)m+1 divides s+1, and,
if i ≥ length(s) then s(i) := 0.
Note: if length(s) = k, then s = 〈s(0), s(1), . . . , s(k − 1)〉.
Also note: ∀s[s ≥ length(s)].
a ∗ b is the number s satisfying: length(s) = length(a) + length(b) and,
for each n, if n < length(a), then s(n) = a(n) and,
if length(a) ≤ n < length(s), then s(n) = b
(
n− length(a)
)
.
a ∗ α is the element β of N satisfying: for each n, if n < length(a),
then β(n) = a(n), and, if length(a) ≤ n, then β(n) = α
(
n− length(a)
)
.
For n ≤ length(a), a(n) := 〈a(0), . . . , a(n− 1)〉.
If confusion seems unlikely, we sometimes write: “an” and not: “a(n)”.
a ⊑ b↔ ∃n ≤ length(b)[a = bn], and: a ⊏ b↔ (a ⊑ b ∧ a 6= b).
a ⊥ b↔ ¬(a ⊑ b ∨ b ⊑ a).
α(n) := αn := 〈α(0), . . . α(n− 1)〉.
a ⊏ α↔ ∃n[αn = a].
We sometimes say: ‘α passes through a’, intending: a ⊏ α.
a ⊥ α↔ α ⊥ a↔ α
(
length(a)
)
⊥ a.
α # β ↔ α ⊥ β ↔ ∃n[α(n) 6= β(n)].
For each p, p is the element of N satisfying ∀n[p(n) = p].
We extend the language of BIM by introducing ∈ and terms denoting subsets of
N. Formulas in which such symbols occur may be translated into formulas in which
they do not occur. Here is a first example.
Bin := {a | ∀n < length(a)[a(n) = 0 ∨ a(n) = 1]}.
Note that ‘a ∈ Bin’ is equivalent to ‘∀n < length(a)[a(n) = 0 ∨ a(n) = 1]’.
Binm := {s ∈ Bin | length(s) = m)}.
For all A,B ⊆ N, A ⊆ B ↔ ∀n[n ∈ A→ n ∈ B].
We also introduce terms denoting subsets of N . Here is an example.
C := {γ | ∀n[γ(n) = 0 ∨ γ(n) = 1]}.
Note that ‘α ∈ C’ is equivalent to ‘∀n < [α(n) = 0 ∨ α(n) = 1]’.
For all X ,Y ⊆ N , X ⊆ Y ↔ ∀α[α ∈ X → α ∈ Y].
For each X ⊆ N , for each B ⊆ N, BarX (B)↔ ∀α ∈ X∃n[αn ∈ B].
Note that BarX (B) is a formula scheme, that becomes a formula if one substi-
tutes formulas defining X , B, respectively.
2.2.2. Decidable and enumerable subsets of N.
Dα := {i | α(i) 6= 0}. Dα is the subset of N decided by α.
The expression ‘i ∈ Dα’ may be considered as an abbreviation of ‘α(i) 6= 0’.
X ⊆ N is decidable or ∆01 if and only if ∃α[X = Dα].
Da := {i | i < length(a) | a(i) 6= 0}.
Note: for each α, Dα =
⋃
n∈N
Dαn.
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Eα := {n | ∃p[α(p) = n+ 1]}. Eα is the subset of N enumerated by α.
X ⊆ N is enumerable or Σ01 if and only if ∃α[X = Eα].
Ea := {n | ∃p < length(a)[a(p) = n+ 1]}.
Note: for each α, Eα =
⋃
n∈N
Eαn.
X ⊆ N is co-enumerable or Π01 if and only if
∃α[X = N \ Eα = {n | ∀p[α(p) 6= n+ 1]}].
Given any α, define β such that
∀n[α(n) = β(n) = 0 ∨
(
α(n) 6= 0 ∧ β(n) = n+ 1
)
], and note: Dα = Eβ .
We thus see: BIM ⊢ ∀α∃β[Dα = Eβ ].
2.2.3. Open and closed subsets of N , spreads and fans.
Gβ := {γ | ∃n[β(γn) 6= 0]}. G ⊆ N is open or Σ01 if and only if ∃β[G = Gβ ].
Fβ := N \ Gβ = {γ | ∀n[β(γn) = 0]}.
F ⊆ N is closed or Π01 if and only if ∃β[F = Fβ ].
Spr(β)↔ ∀s[β(s) = 0↔ ∃n[β(s ∗ 〈n〉) = 0]].
X ⊆ N is a spread if and only if ∃β[Spr(β) ∧ X = Fβ].
In intuitionistic mathematics, not every closed subset of N is a spread, see
Lemma 2.6.
Fan(β)↔
(
Spr(β) ∧ ∀s∃n∀m[β(s ∗ 〈m〉) = 0→ m ≤ n]
)
and
ExplFan(β)↔
(
Spr(β) ∧ ∃γ∀s∀m[β(s ∗ 〈m〉) = 0→ m ≤ γ(s)]
)
.
X ⊆ N is a fan if and only if ∃β[Fan(β) ∧ X = Fβ ].
X ⊆ N is an explicit fan if and only if ∃β[ExplFan(β) ∧ X = Fβ ].
2.2.4. Subsequences.
∀n∀m[αn(m) := α(〈n〉 ∗m)].
αn is called the n-th subsequence of the infinite sequence α.
length(sn) := µp[〈n〉 ∗ p ≥ length(s)] and ∀m < length(sn)[sn(m) = s(〈n〉 ∗m)].
Note: ∀α∀m∀n[(αm)n ⊏ αn].
∀m[aα(m) := α(a ∗m)].
Note: ∀n[〈n〉α = αn].
length(as) := µp[a ∗ p ≥ length(s)] and ∀m < length(as)[as(m) = s(a ∗m)].
Note: ∀α∀m∀a[a(αm) ⊏ aα].
2.2.5. Continuous functions from N to N and from C to N . 2
ϕ : N → N↔ (∀a ∈ Eϕ∀b ∈ Eϕ[a′ ⊑ b′ → a′′ = b′′] ∧ ∀α∃a ∈ Eϕ[a′ ⊏ α]).
Assume: ϕ : N → N.
Then ∀α∀c[ϕ(α) = c↔ ∃n[(αn, c) ∈ Eϕ].
ϕ : N → N ↔
(∀a ∈ Eϕ∀b ∈ Eϕ[a′ ⊑ b′ → a′′ ⊑ b′′] ∧ ∀α∀n∃a ∈ Eϕ[a′ ⊏ α ∧ length(a′′) ≥ n]).
Assume: ϕ : N → N .
Then: ∀a[ϕ|a := max({t | ∃b ∈ Eϕa[b
′ ⊏ a ∧ b′′ = t]})].
And: ∀α∀γ[ϕ|α = γ ↔ ∀n∃m[γn ⊑ ϕ|αm]].
ϕ : C → N ↔ (∀a ∈ Eϕ∀b ∈ Eϕ[a′ ⊑ b′ → a′′ ⊑ b′′]
∧ ∀α ∈ C∀n∃a ∈ Eϕ[a′ ⊏ α ∧ length(a′′) ≥ n]).
Assume: ϕ : C → N .
Then: ∀a ∈ Bin [ϕ|a := max({t | ∃b ∈ Eϕa[b
′
⊏ a ∧ b′′ = t]})].
And: ∀α ∈ C∀γ[ϕ|α = γ ↔ ∀n∃m[γn ⊑ ϕ|αm]].
2The definitions in this Subsubsection deviate from the definitions used in [42, Subsubsection
1.1.5]
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2.2.6. Real numbers.
m =Z n↔ m′ + n′′ = m′′ + n′.
m <Z n↔ m′ + n′′ < m′′ + n′.
0Z := (0, 0)
m+Z n = (m
′ + n′,m′′ + n′′).
m−Z n = (m′ + n′′,m′′ + n′).
m ·Z n := (m′ · n′ +m′′ · n′′,m′ · n′′ +m′′ · n′).
Q := {n | n′′ >Z 0Z}.
m =Q n↔ m′ ·Z n′′ =Z m′′ ·Z n′.
m <Q n↔ m′ ·Z n′′ <Z m′′ ·Z n′.
m ≤Q n↔ m′ ·Z n′′ ≤Z m′′ ·Z n′.
m ≤Q n↔ maxQ(m,n) =Q n↔ minQ(m,n) =Q m.
m+Q n = (m
′ ·Z n
′′ +Z m
′′ ·Z n
′,m′′ ·Z n
′′).
m−Q n = (m′ ·Z n′′ −Z m′′ ·Z n′,m′′ ·Z n′′).
m ·Q n = (m′ ·Z n′,m′′ ·Z n′′).
S := {s | s′ ∈ Q ∧ s′′ ∈ Q ∧ s′ <Q s′′}.
s ⊏S t↔ (t′ <Q s′ ∧ s′′ <Q t′′).
s ⊑S t↔ (t′ ≤Q s′ ∧ s′′ ≤Q t′′).
s <S t↔ s′′ <Q t′.
s ≤S t↔ s′ ≤Q t′′.
For each n, we define nQ in Q by: nQ =
(
(n, 0), (1, 0)
)
.
For all s in S, doubleS(s) is the element u of S satisfying:
u′ +Q u
′′ =Q s
′ +Q s
′′ and u′′ −Q u′ =Q 2Q ·Q (s′′ −Q s′).
Note: ∀s ∈ S∀t ∈ S[s ⊑S t→ doubleS(s) ⊏S doubleS(t)].
For all s in S, for all q in Q such that q >Q 0Q, q ⊗ s is the element u of S
satisfying: u′ +Q u
′′ =Q s
′ +Q s
′′ and u′′ −Q u′ =Q q ·Q (s′′ −Q s′).
s+S t := (s
′ +Q t
′, s′′ +Q t
′′).
s ·S t :=(
minQ(s
′ ·Q t
′, s′′ ·Q t
′, s′ ·Q t
′′, s′′ ·Q t
′′),maxQ(s
′ ·Q t
′, s′′ ·Q t
′, s′ ·Q t
′′, s′′ ·Q t
′′)
)
.
∀α∀n[α′(n) =
(
α(n)
)′
∧ α′′(n) =
(
α(n)
)′′
].
R := {α | ∀n[α(n) ∈ S ∧ α(n+ 1) ⊏S α(n)] ∧ ∀m∃n[α′′(n)−Q α′(n) <Q
1
2m ]}.
α <R β ↔ ∃n[α(n) <S β(n)].
α ≤R β ↔ ∀n[α(n) ≤S β(n)].
∀n[inf(α, β)(n) :=
(
minQ(α
′(n), β′(n)),minQ(α
′′(n), β′′(n))
)
].
∀n[sup(α, β)(n) :=
(
maxQ(α
′(n), β′(n)),maxQ(α
′′(n), β′′(n))
)
].
α #R β ↔ (α <R β ∨ β <R α).
α =R β ↔ (α ≤R β ∧ β ≤R α).
∀n[(α+R β)(n) := α(n) +S β(n)].
∀n[(α ·R β)(n) := α(n) ·S β(n)].
For each q in Q, we define qR in R by: for each n, qR(n) = (q −Q
1
2n , q +Q
1
2n ).
0R := (0Q)R and 1R := (1Q)R.
2.2.7. [0, 1] and C.
[0, 1] := {α ∈ R | 0R ≤R α ≤R 1R}.
(0, 1] := {α ∈ R | 0R <R α ≤R 1R}, and [0, 1) := {α ∈ R | 0R ≤R α <R 1R}.
For all α, β in R, [α, β) := {γ ∈ R | α ≤R γ <R β}.
Hα := {γ ∈ [0, 1] | ∃n∃s ∈ S[α(s) 6= 0 ∧ γ(n) ⊏S s]}.
Note: ∀α∀β ∈ [0, 1]∀γ ∈ [0, 1][(β ∈ Hα ∧ β =R γ)→ γ ∈ Hα].
H ⊆ [0, 1] is open if and only if ∃α[H = Hα].
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Define δ such that δ(〈 〉) = (0Q, 1Q) and, for all s in Bin,
δ(s ∗ 〈0〉) = 〈δ′(s), 13δ
′(s) +Q
2
3δ
′′(s)〉 and δ(s ∗ 〈1〉) = 〈23δ
′(s) +Q
1
3δ
′(s), δ′′(s)〉).
Define ρ : C → [0, 1] such that ∀γ ∈ C[(ρ|γ)(n) = doubleS
(
δ(γn)
)
].
One may prove: ρ : C ։ [0, 1], that is: ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]∃γ ∈ C[ρ|γ =R δ].
For every open subset H of [0, 1], the set {γ ∈ C | ρ|γ ∈ H} is open subset of C.
Define ψ : N → N such that
∀α∀s[(ψ|α)(s) 6= 0↔
(
s ∈ Bin ∧ ∃t < s[δ(s) ⊏S t ∧ α(t) 6= 0]
)
].
One may prove: ∀α∀γ ∈ C[γ ∈ Gψ|α ↔ ρ|γ ∈ Hα].
For each s in S, for each i < 5, define: πi5(s) := (
5−i
5 s
′+Q
i
5s
′′, 5−i−15 s
′+Q
i+1
5 s
′′).
Define ε such that ε(〈 〉) = (0Q, 1Q) and, for all a in Bin, ε(a ∗ 〈0〉) = π15
(
ε(a)
)
and ε(s ∗ 〈1〉) = π35
(
ε(a)
)
. Define τ : C → [0, 1] such that ∀γ ∈ C[(τ |γ)(n) = ε(γn)].
One may prove: τ : C →֒ [0, 1], that is: ∀γ ∈ C∀ζ ∈ C[γ # ζ → τ |γ #R τ |ζ].
Define D := {τ |γ | γ ∈ C}.
Define σ such that ∀s ∈ S[σ(s) 6= 0↔ ∃a ∈ Bin∃j < 3[s = 2625 ⊗ π
2j
5
(
ε(a)
)
]].
Note: ∀δ ∈ [0, 1][∃n∀ζ ∈ D[|δ −R ζ| >
1
2n ]↔ δ ∈ Hσ].
We now prove: ∀δ ∈ [0, 1][δ /∈ Hσ → δ ∈ D].
Let δ in [0, 1] \ Hσ be given.
Note: ∀a ∈ Bin [ε′′(a ∗ 〈0〉) <Q ε′(a ∗ 〈1〉)].
Define γ in C such that, for all m, p,
if p = µq[ε′′(γn ∗ 〈0〉) <Q δ′(q) ∨ δ′′(q) <Q ε′(γn ∗ 〈1〉)],
then γ(m) = 0↔ δ′′(p) <Q ε′(γn ∗ 〈1〉).
One may prove: δ = τ |γ.
Define χ : N → N such that
∀α∀s[(χ|α)(s) 6= 0↔ ∃t < s[t ∈ Bin ∧ s ⊏S ε(t) ∧ α(t) 6= 0]].
One may prove: ∀α∀γ ∈ C[γ ∈ Gα ↔ τ |γ ∈ Hχ|α]
Define ν : N → N such that ∀α∀s[(ν|α)(s) 6= 0↔
(
(χ|α)(s) 6= 0 ∨ σ(s) 6= 0
)
].
One may prove: ∀α[Hν|α = Hχ|α ∪ Hσ] and ∀α∀γ ∈ C[γ ∈ Gα ↔ τ |γ ∈ Hν|α] and
∀α∀δ ∈ [0, 1][δ /∈ Hν|α → δ ∈ D].
[0, 1]2 := {γ | ∀i < 2[γi ∈ [0, 1]} and [0, 1]N := {γ | ∀n[γn ∈ [0, 1]}.
2.2.8. Real functions from [0, 1] to R. 3
ϕ : [0, 1]→R if and only if
(1) ∀n ∈ Eϕ[n′ ∈ S ∧ n′′ ∈ S], and
(2) ∀m ∈ Eϕ∀n ∈ Eϕ[m
′ ⊑S n
′ → m′′ ⊑S n
′′], and
(3) ∀α ∈ [0, 1]∀n∃m∃s[(α(m), s) ∈ Eϕ ∧ s′′ −Q s′ <Q
1
2n ].
Assume: ϕ : [0, 1]→R.
Then: ϕ : α 7→ β ↔ ∀n∃m∃p ∈ Eϕ[|α(m) ⊑S p′ ∧ p′′ ⊑S β(n)].
Let α in [0, 1] be given. Define γ such that ∀n[γ(n) := µs[s ∈ S ∧ s′′ −Q s′ =Q
1
2n ∧ ∃p ≤ s∃m ≤ s∃r ≤ s[ϕ(m) = p+ 1 ∧ α(r) ⊑S p
′ ∧ p′′ ⊑S s]]. Define ϕ(α)
such that ∀n[
(
ϕ(α)
)
(n) = doubleS
(
γ(n)
)
]. Note: ϕ(α) ∈ R and ϕ : α 7→ ϕ(α).
Note that we introduced the notation ‘ϕ(α)’ already, with a different meaning,
see Subsubsection 2.2.5. In practice, there will be no confusion.
2.2.9. Game-theoretic terminology.
s : n→ k ↔ ∀j < n[s(j) < k].
Seq(n, l) := {s | s : n→ l}. Note: Binn = Seq(n, 2).
s ∈I b↔ ∀i[2i < length(s)→ s(2i) = b
(
s(2i)
)
].
s ∈II c↔ ∀i[2i+ 1 < length(s)→ s(2i+ 1) = c
(
s(2i+ 1)
)
].
3The definition slightly deviates from the one used in [40, Subsection 8.4].
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(The numbers b, c should be thought of as strategies for player I, II, respectively.)
s ∈I β ↔ ∀i[2i < length(s)→ s(2i) = β
(
s(2i)
)
].
s ∈II γ ↔ ∀i[2i+ 1 < length(s)→ s(2i+ 1) = γ
(
s(2i+ 1)
)
].
α ∈I β ↔ ∀i[α(2i) = β
(
α(2i)
)
].
α ∈II γ ↔ ∀i[α(2i+ 1) = γ
(
α(2i+ 1)
)
].
For all α, for all b, α ∈I b↔ ∀i[α(2i) < b→ α(2i) = b
(
α(2i)
)
].
For all α, for all c, α ∈II c↔ ∀i[α(2i+ 1) < c→ α(2i+ 1) = c
(
α(2i+ 1)
)
].
ω × ω := {s | length(s) = 2}.
2× ω := {s | length(s) = 2 ∧ s(0) < 2}.
ω × 2 := {s | length(s) = 2 ∧ s(1) < 2}.
For each n > 0, (ω × 2)n := {s | length(s) = 2n ∧ ∀i < n[s(2i+ 1) < 2]} and
(ω × 2)n × ω := {s | length(s) = 2n+ 1 ∧ ∀i < n[s(2i+ 1) < 2]}.
(ω × 2)<ω :=
⋃
n(ω × 2)
n.
(ω × 2)ω := {δ | ∀n[δ(2n+ 1) < 2]}.
For every δ, δI , δII satisfy: ∀n[δI(n) = δ(2n)] and ∀n[δII(n) = δ(2n+ 1)].
For every s, length(sI) = µn[length(s) ≤ 2n] and ∀n < length(sI)[sI(n) = s(2n)],
and length(sII) = µn[length(s) ≤ 2n+1] and ∀n < length(sII)[sII(n) = s(2n+1)].
2.3. Possible further assumptions.
2.3.1. First Axiom Scheme of Countable Choice, ACω,ω(= AC0,0):
∀n∃m[R(n,m)]→ ∃γ∀n[R
(
n, γ(n)
)
].
The intuitionistic mathematician accepts ACω,ω. If ∀n∃m[R(n,m)], he builds
the promised γ step by step, first choosing γ(0) such that R
(
0, γ(0)
)
, then choosing
γ(1) such that R
(
1, γ(1)
)
), and so on. In his view, there is no need to give a finite
description or algorithm that determines the infinitely many values of γ at one
stroke.
2.3.2. Second Axiom Scheme of Countable Choice, ACω,N = AC0,1:
∀n∃γ[R(n, γ]→ ∃γ∀n[R(n, γn)].
The intuitionistic mathematician acceptsACω,N . If ∀n∃γ[R(n, γ)], he first starts
a project for building γ0 with the property R(0, γ0) and determines γ0(0), he then
starts a project for building γ1 with the property R(1, γ1) and determines γ1(0),
and also, continuing the project started earlier, γ0(1), he then starts a project for
building γ2 with the property R(2, γ2) and determines γ2(0) and also, continuing
the projects started earlier, γ1(1) and γ0(2), . . ..
2.3.3. The Fan Theorem as an Axiom Scheme, FAN:
∀(β[
(
Fan(β) ∧ BarFβ (B)
)
→ ∃a[Da ⊆ B ∧ BarFβ (Da)]].
2.3.4. The (strict) Fan Theorem, FT:
∀α[Bar C(Dα)→ ∃m[BarC(Dαm)]] or , equivalently,
∀β[ExplFan(β)→ ∀α[BarFβ(Dα)→ ∃m[BarFβ (Dαm)]]] or , equivalently ,
∀β[ExplFan(β)→ ∀α[BarFβ (Dα)→ ∃m∀γ ∈ Fβ∃n ≤ m[γn ∈ Dα]]].
In this paper, we restrict attention to FT. For the equivalence of the three
formulations of FT, see [40, Section 2.3, Theorem 9.6(ii) and Theorem 7.7(v)], and
also [24] and [26, vol. I, Chapter 4, Section 7.5].
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2.3.5. Brouwer’s Thesis: Bar Induction as an Axiom Scheme, BARIND:
(
BarN (B) ∧ ∀s[s ∈ B → s ∈ C] ∧ ∀s[∀n[s ∗ 〈n〉 ∈ C]→ s ∈ C]
)
→ 〈 〉 ∈ C.
Brouwer derived FAN from BARIND, see [40, Subsections 2.2 and 2.3].
2.3.6. Church’s Thesis, CT:
∃τ∃ψ∀α∃e∀n∃z[z = µi[τ(e, n, i) 6= 0] ∧ ψ(z) = α(n)].
Kleene has shown that CT is true in the model of BIM given by the computable
functions by providing Ka´lmar-elementary functions τ, ψ satisfying the above con-
ditions.
Note that our formulation of CT is cautious and somewhat weaker than the
usual one. We do not require that the set {(e, n, z)|τ(e, n, z) 6= 0} coincides with
Kleene’s set T , but only ask that the set behaves appropriately. A similar ‘abstract’
approach to Church’s Thesis has been advocated by F. Richman, see [22] and [3,
Chapter 3, Section 1].
2.3.7. Kleene’s Alternative (to the Fan Theorem), ¬!FT:
∃α[BarC(Dα) ∧ ∀m[¬BarC(Dαm)]].
The following result is due to Kleene.
Theorem 2.1. BIM +CT ⊢ ¬!FT.
Proof. Let τ, ψ be as in CT. Define α such that, for all m, for all c in Binm,
α(c) = 0↔ ∀e < m∀z < m[z = µi[τ(e, e, i) 6= 0]→ c(e) = 1− ψ(z)].
Let γ in C be given. Find e such that, for all n, γ(n) = ψ(µi[τ(e, n, i) 6= 0]).
Define z = µi[τ(e, e, i) 6= 0]. Note: γ(e) = ψ(z). Define m := max(e, z) + 1 and
note: α(γm) 6= 0. Conclude: BarC(Dα).
Let m be given. Find c in Binm such that ∀e < m∀z < m[z = µi[τ(e, e, i) 6=
0] → c(e) = 1 − ψ(z)]. Note: ∀n ≤ m[α(cn) = 0]. Define γ := c ∗ 0 and note:
∀n[c ∗ 0n > m] and conclude: ¬∃k[γk < m ∧ α(γk) 6= 0] and: ¬BarC(Dαm). 
The above proof may be found in [26, vol.I, Chapter 4, Subsection 7.6]. In [40,
Section 3] one finds two proofs.
2.3.8. Brouwer’s (unrestricted) Continuity Principle as an Axiom Scheme, BCP:
∀α∃n[αRn]→ ∀α∃m∃n∀β[αm ⊏ β → βRn].
Brouwer used this principle for the first time in 1918, see [4, Section 1, page 13].
The intuitionistic mathematician believes the axiom to be plausible. He argues
as follows. If ∀α∃n[αRn], I must be able, given any α, to find effectively an n
as promised, also if the values of α are disclosed one by one and nothing is told
about a law governing the development of α as a whole. I will decide upon n at
some point of time and, at that point of time, only finitely many values of α, say
α(0), α(1), . . . , α(m− 1), will be known to me.
From a classical point of view, BCP is doubtful. Kleene proved, using realiz-
ability methods, that his formal system FIM for intuitionistic analysis, actually
an extension of BIM + FT + BCP, is (simply) consistent, see [12, Chapter II,
Subsection 9.2]. Kleene’s proof should convince both the classical mathematician
and the constructive mathematician, should the latter accept BARIND but have
reservations about BCP.
It is not difficult to see that BIM + CT + BCP is inconsistent, as it implies
∀α∃m∀β[βm = αm→ β = α], see [26, vol. I, Chapter 4, Theorem 6.7].
The next two axioms strengthen BCP. Kleene’s consistency proof extends to
these stronger forms of the Continuity Principle.
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2.3.9. The First Axiom Scheme of Continuous Choice, ACN ,ω(= AC1,0):
∀α∃n[αRn]→ ∃ϕ : N → N∀α[αRϕ(α)].
2.3.10. The Second Axiom Scheme of Continuous Choice, ACN ,N (= AC1,1):
∀α∃β[αRβ] → ∃ϕ : N → N∀α[αRϕ|α].
2.3.11. Weak Ko¨nig’s Lemma, WKL:
∀α[∀m[¬Bar C(Dαm)]→ ∃γ ∈ C∀n[α(γn) = 0]].
WKL, as a classical theorem, dates from 1927, see [13]. It is a contraposition
of FT and, from a classical point of view, the two are equivalent. The following
result is due to H. Ishihara, see [11].
Theorem 2.2. BIM ⊢WKL→ FT.
Proof. Let α be given such that BarC(Dα). Define β such that
∀n∀a ∈ Binn[β(a) 6= 0↔
(
α(a) 6= 0 ∧ ∃b ∈ Binn∀m ≤ n[α(bm) = 0]
)
].
Note: ∀n[¬BarC [Binn ∩Dβ)] and ∀m[¬Bar C(Dβm)].
Using WKL, find γ in C such that ∀n[β(γn) = 0]. Find n such that α(γn) 6= 0.
Conclude: ∀b ∈ Binn∃m ≤ n[α(bm) 6= 0] and: ∃m[BarC(Dαm)]. 
2.3.12. The Lesser Limited Principle of Omniscience, LLPO:
∀α[∀p[2p+ 1 6= µn[α(n) 6= 0]] ∨ ∀p[2p 6= µn[α(n) 6= 0]]].
Theorem 2.3. BIM ⊢ BCP→ ¬LLPO.
Proof. Assume LLPO. Define αRk ↔ (k < 2 ∧ 2p+ k 6= µn[α(n) 6= 0]) and note:
∀α∃k[αRk].
Using BCP, find m,k such that k < 2 and ∀α[0m ⊏ α→ αRk], that is:
∀α[0m ⊏ α→ ∀p[2p+ k 6= µn[α(n) 6= 0]]].
Consider α := 0(2m+ k) ∗ 〈1〉 ∗ 0 and conclude: contradiction. 
Theorem 2.4. BIM ⊢WKL→ LLPO.
Proof. Assume WKL. Let α be given. Define β such that, for every s, β(s) = 0
if and only if ∃n∃k < 2[s = kn ∧ ∀p[2p + k < n → 2p + k 6= µn[α(n) 6= 0]]].
Note: ∀m∃k < 2∀n ≤ m[β(kn) = 0]. Using WKL, find γ such that ∀n[β(γn) = 0].
Define k := γ(0) and conclude: γ = k and ∀p[2p+ k 6= µn[α(n) 6= 0]]. 
Using a weak axiom of countable choice, one may also prove LLPO →WKL,
see Theorem 4.2.
2.3.13. The Limited Principle of Omniscience, LPO:
∀α[∃n[α(n) 6= 0] ∨ ∀n[α(n) = 0]].
LPO and LLPO were introduced by E. Bishop, see [3, Chapter 1, Section 1].
The following result is not difficult and well-known, see [19, Section 2.6] and [1,
Theorem 3.1].
Theorem 2.5. BIM ⊢ LPO→ LLPO.
Proof. Let α be given. Apply LPO and distinguish two cases.
Case (1). ∃n[α(n) 6= 0]. Find q, k such that k < 2 and 2q + k = µn[α(n) 6= 0].
Conclude: ∀p[2p+ 1− k 6= µn[α(n) 6= 0]].
Case (2). ∀n[α(n) = 0]. Then ∀k < 2∀p[2p+ k 6= µn[α(n) 6= 0]]. 
The following Lemma shows that, in BIM+BCP, not every closed subset of N
is a spread, see also [42, Theorem 2.10 (vi)].
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Lemma 2.6. BIM ⊢ ∀β∃γ[Spr(γ) ∧ Fβ = Fγ ]→ LPO.
Proof. Let α be given. Define β such that β(0) = 0 and ∀n∀s[β(〈n〉 ∗ s) = 0 ↔
α(n) 6= 0]. Assume we find γ such that Spr(γ) and Fβ = Fγ . If γ(0) = 0, then
∃n[α(n) 6= 0] and, if γ(n) 6= 0, then ∀n[α(n) = 0]. 
We would like to make a philosophical observation. For a constructive math-
ematician, the assumptions LPO, WKL and LLPO make no sense, as he does
not know a situation in which these assumptions are true. Theorem 2.4: WKL→
LLPO concludes something which is never true from something which is never
true. Nevertheless, the proof of Theorem 2.4 makes sense. It shows us how to find,
given any α, a suitable β such that if β has the WKL-property, then α has the
LLPO-property. This part of the argument does not use the assumption that every
β has the WKL-property. Theorems 2.2 and 2.5 deserve a similar comment.
The reader may find more information on the axioms of intuitionistic analysis in
[5], [6], [8], [12], [9] and [26].
3. The Σ01-separation principle
3.1. In classical reverse mathematics, weak Ko¨nig’s Lemma is equivalent to a
principle called Σ01-separation, see [23, Lemma IV.4.4]. The following statement,
formulated in the intuitionistic language of BIM, comes close to this principle.
Σ01-separation principle, Σ
0
1-Sep:
∀α[¬∃n∀m < 2[(n,m) ∈ Eα]→ ∃γ∀n[
(
n, γ(n)
)
/∈ Eα]].
The next Theorem seems to confirm the just-mentioned classical result.
Theorem 3.1. BIM ⊢WKL↔ Σ01-Sep.
Proof. (i) We prove, in BIM: for each α, there exists β such that
¬∃n∀m < 2[(n,m) ∈ Eα]→ ∀m[¬BarC(Dβm)]
and
∃γ ∈ C∀n[β(γn) = 0]→ ∃γ ∈ C∀n[
(
n, γ(n)
)
/∈ Eα].
The conclusion WKL→ Σ01-Sep then is immediate.
In fact, the argument shows that there exists a continuous function ϕ : N → N
giving, for each α, a suitable β := ϕ|α. We did not think it useful to mention ϕ
explicitly.
This observation holds for many of the theorems that follow.
Let α be given.
Define β such that ∀m∀a ∈ Binm[β(a) = 0↔ ∀n < m[
(
n, a(n)
)
/∈ Eαm]].
Assume ¬∃n∀m < 2[(n,m) ∈ Eα].
Let m be given. Note: ∀n < m∃i < 2[(n, i) /∈ Eαm] and find a in Binm such
that ∀n < m[
(
n, a(n)
)
/∈ Eαm].
Conclude: ∀j ≤ m[β(aj) = 0] and ¬BarC(Dβ ∩Binm).
Conclude: ∀m[¬BarC(Dβm)].
Assume γ in C and ∀n[β(γn) = 0]. Conclude: ∀n∀m > n[
(
n, γ(n)
)
/∈ Eαm] and:
∀n[
(
n, γ(n)
)
/∈ Eα].
(ii) We now prove, in BIM: for each α, there exists β such that
∀n[¬BarC(Dαn)]→ ¬∃n∀m < 2[(n,m) ∈ Eβ ]
and
∃γ ∈ C∀n[
(
n, γ(n)
)
/∈ Eβ ]→ ∃γ ∈ C∀n[α(γn) = 0].
The conclusion Σ01-Sep→WKL then is immediate.
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Let α be given. Define β such that, for both i < 2, for all n, for all s,
if s ∈ Bin and BarC∩s∗〈i〉(Dαn) and ¬BarC∩s∗〈1−i〉(Dαn), then β(n, s) = (s, i)+ 1,
and, if not, then β(n, s) = 0.
Note: ¬∃s∀m < 2[(s,m) ∈ Eβ ].
Let γ in C be given such that ∀s[
(
s, γ(s)
)
/∈ Eβ ]. Define δ in C such that
∀n[δ(n) = γ(δn)]. Suppose we find n such that α(δn) 6= 0. Define q := δn+ 1 and
note: δn ∈ Dαq, that is: BarC∩δn(Dαq). We prove, using backwards induction: for
each p ≤ n, BarC∩δp(Dαq). Clearly, this is true if p = n. Now suppose p+ 1 ≤ n
and BarC∩δ(p+1)(Dαq). Note: δ(p+ 1) = δp ∗ 〈γ(δp)〉. Note:
(
δp, γ(δp)
)
/∈ Eβ and,
therefore: BarC∩δp∗〈1−γ(δ(p)〉(Dαq) and: BarC∩δp(Dαq). After n steps we reach
the conclusion: BarC(Dαq). This contradicts the assumption: ∀m[¬BarC(Dαm)].
Conclude: ∀n[α(δn) = 0]. 
Theorem 3.1 shows that Σ01-Sep, like WKL, is not constructive, see Theorem
2.4. It is not true in intuitionistic analysis and it also fails in the model of BIM
given by the recursive functions.
4. ACω,ω, some special cases
The following restricted version ofACω,ω is provable in BIM as it is a consequence
of Axiom 3, see Section 2.
4.1. Minimal Axiom of Countable Choice, ∆01-ACω,ω:
∀α[∀n∃m[α(m,n) = 0]→ ∃γ∀n[α
(
n, γ(n)
)
= 0]].
4.2. Axiom Scheme of Countable Unique Choice, ACω,ω! = AC0,0!:
∀n∃!m[R(n,m)]→ ∃α∀m[
(
R(m,α(m)
)
].
where ‘∀n∃![R(n,m)]’ abbreviates ‘∀n∃m[R(n,m) ∧ ∀p[R(n, p)→ m = p]]’.
ACω,ω! is not a theorem of BIM, see [27].
4.3. Σ01-First Axiom of Countable Choice, Σ
0
1-ACω,ω:
∀α[∀n∃m[(n,m) ∈ Eα]→ ∃γ∀n[
(
n, γ(n)
)
∈ Eα]].
Theorem 4.1. BIM ⊢ Σ01-ACω,ω.
Proof. Assume ∀n∃m[(n,m) ∈ Eα]. Then ∀n∃m∃p[α(p) = (n,m)+ 1]. Find δ such
that ∀n[δ(n) = µq[α(q′) = (n, q′′) + 1]]. Define γ such that ∀n[γ(n) = δ′′(n)] and
note: ∀n[
(
n, γ(n)
)
∈ Eα]. 
X ⊆ N is Π01 if and only if there exists α such that X = N \ Eα.
4.4. Π01-First Axiom of Countable Choice, Π
0
1-ACω,ω:
∀α[∀n∃m[(n,m) /∈ Eα]→ ∃γ∀n[
(
n, γ(n)
)
/∈ Eα]].
Π01-ACω,ω is unprovable in BIM, see Subsection 4.8. In [40, Section 6], we
introduced the following weak version of this axiom. Using this weak version, one
may prove ∀β[Fan(β)→ ExplFan(β)].
4.5. Weak Π01-First Axiom of Countable Choice, Weak-Π
0
1-ACω,ω:
∀α[∀m∃n∀p ≥ n[α(m, p) 6= 0]→ ∃γ∀m∀p ≥ γ(m)[α(m, p) 6= 0]].
Weak-Π01-ACω,ω follows from ACω,ω! = AC0,0!.
Weak-Π01-ACω,ω is closely related to but slightly weaker than the axiom scheme
ACm0,0 introduced in [20, Subsection 3.1].
One may also study statements one obtains from ACω,ω by limiting the number
of alternatives one has at each choice.
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4.6. Axiom Scheme of Countable Binary Choice, ACω,2:
∀n∃m < 2[R(n,m)]→ ∃γ ∈ C∀n[R
(
n, γ(n)
)
]
Here is a restricted version of ACω,2:
4.7. Π01-Axiom of Countable Binary Choice, Π
0
1-ACω,2:
∀α[∀n∃m < 2[(n,m) /∈ Eα]→ ∃γ ∈ C∀n[
(
n, γ(n)
)
/∈ Eα]]
A result related to the following Theorem has been proven by U. Kohlenbach,
see [14, Theorem 3]. A similar result is mentioned in [1, Subsection 2.2].
Theorem 4.2. BIM ⊢ (Π01-ACω,2 ∧ LLPO)↔WKL.
Proof. (i) Assume, in BIM, Π01-ACω,2 and LLPO. It suffices to prove: Σ
0
1-Sep,
as, according to Theorem 3.1, BIM ⊢ Σ01-Sep↔WKL.
Let α be given such that ∀n¬∀m < 2[(n,m) ∈ Eα]. Let n be given. Define β
such that ∀q∀i < 2[β(2q + i) 6= 0↔ q = µp[α(p) = (n, i) + 1)]]. Apply LLPO and
find i < 2 such that ∀q[2q + i 6= µm[β(m) 6= 0]] and, therefore, (n, i) /∈ Eα.
Conclude: ∀n∃i < 2[(n, i) /∈ Eα].
Apply Π01-ACω,2 and find γ in C such that ∀n[
(
n, γ(n)
)
) /∈ Eα].
Conclude: ∀α[∀n[¬∀m < 2[(n,m) ∈ Eα] → ∃γ ∈ C∀n[
(
n, γ(n)
)
) /∈ Eα]], that is:
Σ01-Sep.
(ii) Note:
BIM ⊢ Σ01-Sep ↔
(
∀α[∀n¬¬∃m < 2[(n,m) /∈ Eα] → ∃γ ∈ C∀n[
(
n, γ(n)
)
/∈ Eα]]
)
.
Conclude: BIM ⊢ Σ01-Sep → Π
0
1-ACω,2. The conclusion BIM ⊢ WKL → LLPO
has been drawn in Theorem 2.4. 
From a constructive point of view, Σ01-Sep, or equivalently, WKL, is an axiom
of countable choice that is formulated too strongly.
4.8. Π01-ACω,2 is unprovable in BIM. Note that the theory BIM +CT may be
translated into intuitionistic arithmetic HA, by interpreting functions from N to N
as indices of total computable functions. The double negation translations due to
Go¨del and Gentzen show that first order classical (Peano) arithmetic PA, the theory
that results from HA from PA by adding the axiom scheme X ∨ ¬X , is consistent.
It follows that also the theory BIM+CT remains consistent upon adding the axiom
scheme X ∨ ¬X .
From Theorem 4.2, we may conclude: BIM+¬!FT+LLPO+Π01-ACω,2 is not
consistent as ¬!FT contradicts WKL.
Conclude: BIM+ ¬!FT+ LLPO ⊢ ¬Π01-ACω,2.
On the other hand, BIM + ¬!FT + LLPO is consistent, as it is a subsystem of
BIM+CT+X ∨¬X . It follows that Π01-ACω,2 is not derivable in BIM+¬!FT+
LLPO and, a fortiori, not derivable in BIM. The stronger axiom Π01-ACω,ω and
the even stronger axiom Π01-ACω,N , to be introduced in Section 6, also are not
derivable in BIM.
From Theorem 4.2, we also conclude BIM + ¬!FT+Π01-ACω,2 ⊢ ¬LLPO.
In the context of HA, Church’s Thesis is sometimes introduced as an axiom
scheme, CT0, see [26, vol. I, Ch. 4, Sect. 3]:
∀n∃m[nAm]→ ∃e∀n∃z[T (〈e, n, z〉) ∧ ∀i < z[¬T (〈e, n, i〉)] ∧ nA
(
U(z)
)
].
It is not difficult to see that BIM + CT + ACω,ω and also BIM + CT + ACω,N
translate into HA+CT0. There is no straightforward model for HA+CT0 but, using
realizability, one may show that, if HA is consistent, then so is HA + CT0, see [26,
vol. I, Ch. 4, Sect. 4].
It follows that, if HA is consistent, then BIM+ ¬!FT+Π01-ACω,2 is consistent.
15
4.9. Axiom Scheme of Countable Finite Choice, ACω,<ω:
∀β[∀m∃n ≤ β(m)[R(n,m)]→ ∃γ∀n[γ(n) ≤ β(n) ∧ nRγ(n)]].
4.10. Π01-Axiom of Countable Finite Choice, Π
0
1-ACω,<ω:
∀α[∀n∃m ≤ α0(n)[(n,m) /∈ Eα1 ]→ ∃γ∀n[γ(n) ≤ α
0(n) ∧
(
n, γ(n)
)
/∈ Eα1 ]].
We conjecture that Π01-ACω,<ω is not provable in BIM + Π
0
1-ACω,2, but we
have no proof of this conjecture. There might be many statements intermediate in
strength like Π01-ACω,3, the Π
0
1-Axiom of Countable Ternary Choice.
5. Contrapositions of some special cases of ACω,ω
The following statement is a contraposition of ACω,ω:
5.1. First Axiom Scheme of Reverse Countable Choice,
←−−−−
ACω,ω:
∀γ∃n[R
(
n, γ(n)
)
]→ ∃n∀m[R(n,m)].
A special case is:
5.2. Minimal Axiom of Reverse Countable Choice, ∆01-
←−−−−
ACω,ω :
∀α[∀γ∃n[α
(
n, γ(n)
)
6= 0]→ ∃n∀m[α(n,m) 6= 0]].
The following result may be found in [29, Section 2].
Theorem 5.1. BIM +∆01-
←−−−−
ACω,ω ⊢ LPO.
Proof. Let β be given.
Assuming ∆01-
←−−−−
ACω,ω, we prove: ∃n[β(n) 6= 0] ∨ ∀n[β(n) = 0].
To this end, define α such that ∀n∀m[α(n,m) = 0↔ (βn = 0n ∧ βm 6= 0m)].
For every γ, either : β
(
γ(0)
)
= 0
(
γ(0)
)
and, therefore, α
(
0, γ(0)
)
6= 0,
or : β
(
γ(0)
)
6= 0
(
γ(0)
)
, and, therefore, α
(
γ(0), γ(γ(0))
)
6= 0.
Conclude: ∀γ∃n[α
(
n, γ(n)
)
6= 0].
Applying ∆01-
←−−−−
ACω,ω, find n such that ∀m[α(n,m) 6= 0].
Either : βn 6= 0n and ∃j[β(j) 6= 0], or : βn = 0n. In the latter case, for each m,
βm = 0m and ∀j[β(j) = 0]. 
5.3. Axiom Scheme of Reverse Countable Binary Choice,
←−−−−
ACω,2 :
∀γ ∈ C∃n[R
(
n, γ(n)
)
]→ ∃n∀m < 2[R(n,m)]].
In [29, Section 4],
←−−−−
ACω,2 has been shown to be a consequence of FT+ACω,N .
We introduce a restricted version, the
∆01-Axiom of Reverse Countable Binary Choice, ∆
0
1-
←−−−−
ACω,2:
∀α[∀γ ∈ C∃n[
(
n, γ(n)
)
∈ Dα]→ ∃n∀m < 2[(n,m) ∈ Dα]].
Theorem 5.2. BIM ⊢∆01-
←−−−−
ACω,2.
Proof. Let α be given such that ∀γ ∈ C∃n[
(
n, γ(n)
)
∈ Dα]. Define γ in C such that
∀n[(n, 0) ∈ Dα ↔ γ(n) = 1]. Find n such that
(
n, γ(n)
)
∈ Dα. Note: γ(n) = 1 and
∀m < 2[(n,m) ∈ Dα]. 
We now introduce a less restricted version:
5.4. Σ01-Axiom of Reverse Countable Binary Choice, Σ
0
1-
←−−−−
ACω,2:
∀α[∀γ ∈ C∃n[
(
n, γ(n)
)
∈ Eα]→ ∃n∀m < 2[(n,m) ∈ Eα]].
We define its strong negation as follows:
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5.5. ¬!(Σ01-
←−−−−
ACω,2):
∃α[∀γ ∈ C∃n[
(
n, γ(n)
)
∈ Eα] ∧ ¬∃n∀m < 2[(n,m) ∈ Eα]].
Lemma 5.3. BIM proves the following:
(i) FT→ Σ01-
←−−−−
ACω,2 and ¬!(Σ01-
←−−−−
ACω,2)→ ¬!FT.
(ii) Σ01-
←−−−−
ACω,2 → FT and ¬!FT→ ¬!(Σ01-
←−−−−
ACω,2).
Proof. (i) We prove, in BIM: for each α, there exists β such that
∀γ ∈ C∃n[
(
n, γ(n)
)
∈ Eα]→ BarC(Dβ)] and
∃m[BarC(Dβm)]→ ∃n∀m < 2[(n,m) ∈ Eα].
The two promised conclusions then follow easily.
Let α be given. Define β such that
∀m∀a ∈ Binm[β(a) 6= 0↔ ∃n < m[
(
n, a(n)
)
∈ Eαm]].
Assume: ∀γ ∈ C∃n[
(
n, γ(n)
)
∈ Eα]. Let γ in C be given. Find n, p such that(
n, γ(n)
)
∈ Eαp and n < p. Note: β(γp) 6= 0. We thus see: ∀γ ∈ C∃p[β(γp) 6= 0],
that is: BarC(Dβ).
Let m be given such that BarC(Dβm). Note: ∀a ∈ Binm[m < a] and:
∀a ∈ Binm∃n ≤ m[an ∈ Dβm]. Assume ∀n < m∃i < 2[(n, i) /∈ Eαm]. Define a in
Binm such that ∀n < m[(n, 0) /∈ Eαm ↔ a(n) = 0]. Then ∀n < m[
(
n, a(n)
)
/∈ Eαm]
and ∀n ≤ m[β(an) 6= 0]. Contradiction.
Conclude: ∃n < m∀i < 2[(n, i) ∈ Eαm ⊆ Eα].
(ii) We prove, in BIM: for each α, there exists β such that
BarC(Dα)→ ∀γ ∈ C∃n[
(
n, γ(n)
)
∈ Eβ ] and
∃n∀m < 2[(n,m) ∈ Eβ ]→ ∃m[BarC(Dαm].
The two promised conclusions then follow easily.
Let α be given. Define β such that,
for every s in Bin, for all i < 2, for all p, if either: (1) BarC(Dαp), or: (2)
BarC∩s∗〈i〉(Dαp) and not BarC∩s∗〈1−i〉(Dαp), then β(s ∗ 〈i〉, p) = (s, i)+ 1, and, (3)
if both (1.1) and (1.2) fail, then β(s ∗ 〈i〉, p) = 0, and,
for all s, for all p, if s = 〈 〉 or s /∈ Bin, then β(s, p) = 0.
Assume BarC(Dα). We shall prove: ∀γ ∈ C∃n[
(
n, γ(n)
)
∈ Eβ ].
Let γ in C be given. Define δ in C such that ∀n[δ(n) = γ(δn)]. Find n such that
α(δn) 6= 0. Define p := δn+ 1 and note: δn ∈ Dαp.
We claim: for all j ≤ n, either ∃i ≤ n[
(
δi, γ(δi)
)
∈ Eβ ], or BarC∩δj(Dαp). We
prove this claim by backwards induction, starting from j = n. Note: BarC∩δn(Dαp).
Now assume j < n and BarC∩δ(j+1)(Dαp), that is: BarC∩δ(j)∗〈δ(j)〉(Dαp). Find out
if also BarC∩δ(j)∗〈1−δ(j)〉(Dαp).
If so, then BarC∩δ(j)(Dαp), and, if not, then β(δj ∗ 〈δ(j)〉, p) =
(
δj, δ(j)
)
+ 1,
and
(
δj, δ(j)
)
=
(
δj, γ(δ(j)
)
∈ Eβ .
We may conclude: either ∃j ≤ n[(δj, δ(j)
)
∈ Eβ ], or BarC(Dαp). Note that, if
BarC(Dαp), then ∀s ∈ Bin∀i < 2[β(s ∗ 〈i〉, p) = (s, i) + 1] and:
∀s ∈ Bin[
(
s, γ(s)
)
∈ Eβ .
We thus see: ∀γ ∈ C∃s[
(
s, γ(s)
)
∈ Eβ ].
Now assume: ∃n∀m < 2[(n,m) ∈ Eβ ]. Conclude: ∃p[BarC(Dαp)]. 
Theorem 5.4. BIM proves: FT↔ Σ01-
←−−−−
ACω,2 and: ¬!FT↔ ¬!(Σ01-
←−−−−
ACω,2).
Proof. Use Lemma 5.3. 
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5.6. Axiom Scheme of Reverse Countable Finite Choice,
←−−−−−
ACω,<ω:
∀β[∀γ∃n[γ(n) ≤ β(n)→ R
(
n, γ(n)
)
]→ ∃m∀n ≤ β(m)[R(n,m)]].
←−−−−−
ACω,<ω may be concluded from FT + ACN ,ω, by a slight extension of the
argument given in [29, Section 4].
The following is a restricted version:
Σ01-
←−−−−−
ACω,<ω:
∀α[∀γ∃n[γ(n) ≤ α0(n)→
(
n, γ(n)
)
∈ Eα1 ]→ ∃n∀m ≤ α
0(n)[(n,m) ∈ Eα1 ]].
We introduce a strong negation of this restricted version:
¬!(Σ01-
←−−−−−
ACω,<ω):
∃α[∀γ∃n[γ(n) ≤ α0(n)→
(
n, γ(n)
)
∈ Eα1 ] ∧ ¬∃n∀m ≤ α
0(n)[(n,m) ∈ Eα1 ]].
Lemma 5.5. BIM proves:
(i) Σ01-
←−−−−−
ACω,<ω → Σ01-
←−−−−
ACω,2 and ¬!(Σ01-
←−−−−
ACω,2)→ ¬!(Σ01-
←−−−−−
ACω,<ω)
(ii) FT→ Σ01-
←−−−−−
ACω,<ω and ¬!(Σ
0
1-
←−−−−−
ACω,<ω)→ ¬!FT.
Proof. (i) We prove, in BIM: for each α, there exists β such that
∀γ ∈ C∃n[
(
n, γ(n)
)
∈ Eα]→ ∀γ∃n[γ(n) ≤ β
0(n)→
(
n, γ(n)
)
∈ Eβ1 ] and
∃n∀m ≤ β0(n)[(n,m) ∈ Eβ1 ]→ ∃n∀i < 2[(n, i) ∈ Eα].
Let α be given. Define β such that β0 = 1 and β1 = α.
Assume ∀γ ∈ C∃n[
(
n, γ(n)
)
∈ Eα]. Let γ be given. Define γ∗ such that
∀n[γ∗(n) = min
(
1, γ(n)
)
]. Note: γ∗ ∈ C and find n such that
(
n, γ∗(n)
)
∈ Eα.
If γ∗(n) 6= γ(n), then γ(n) > 1 = β0(n), and if γ∗(n) = γ(n), then
(
n, γ(n)
)
∈ Eα.
Conclude: ∀γ∃n[γ(n) ≤ β0(n)→
(
n, γ(n)
)
∈ Eβ1 ].
Assume ∃n∀m ≤ β0(n)[(n,m) ∈ Eβ1 ]. Clearly, ∃n∀i < 2[(n, i) ∈ Eα].
(ii) We prove, in BIM: for each α, there exists β such that
∀γ∃n[γ(n) > α0(n) ∨
(
n, γ(n)
)
∈ Eα1 ]→ BarC(Dβ) and
∃m[BarC(Dβm)]→ ∃n∀m ≤ α
0(n)[(n,m) ∈ Eα1 ].
The two promised conclusions then follow easily.
Define Cod2 : N→ Bin such that
Cod2(〈 〉) = 〈 〉 and ∀s∀n[Cod2(s ∗ 〈n〉) = Cod2(s) ∗ 0n ∗ 〈1〉].
Note: ∀t ∈ Bin∃s∃i[t = Cod2(s) ∗ 0i].
Let α be given. Define β such that, for all s, i, β
(
Cod2(s) ∗ 0i
)
6= 0 if and only
if ∃n < length(s)[s(n) > α0(n) ∨
(
n, s(n)
)
∈ E
α1length(s) ∨ α
0
(
length(s)
)
< i].
Assume: ∀γ∃n[γ(n) ≤ α0(n)→
(
n, γ(n)
)
∈ Eα1 ].
Assume: δ ∈ C. Define γ, by induction, such that, for each n,
if ∃i ≤ α0(n)[Cod2(γn ∗ 〈i〉) ⊏ δ], then Cod2
(
γ(n+ 1)
)
⊏ δ, and,
if not, then γ(n) := 0.
Note: ∀n[γ(n) ≤ α0(n)].
Find n, p such that
(
n, γ(n)
)
∈ E
α1p
. Define q := max(n, p).
Note: β
(
Cod2(γ(q + 1))
)
6= 0 and distinguish two cases.
Case (1). c := Cod2(γ(q + 1)) ⊏ δ and β(c) 6= 0
Case (2). ∃n∀i ≤ α0(n)[Cod2(γn ∗ 〈i〉) ⊥ δ].
Find n0 := µn∀i ≤ α0(n)[Cod2(γn ∗ 〈i〉) ⊥ δ] and note:
d := Cod2(γn0) ∗ 0
(
α0(n0) + 1
)
⊏ δ and β(d) 6= 0.
In both cases ∃p[β(δp) 6= 0].
We thus see: BarC(Dβ).
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Let m be given such that BarC(Dβm).
Suppose: ∀i < m∃j ≤ α0(i)[(i, j) /∈ E
α1m
]].
Find s such that length(s) = m and ∀i < m[s(i) ≤ α0(i) ∧
(
i, s(i)
)
/∈ E
α1m
].
Note: Cod2(s) > m and ∀t ⊑ Cod2(s)[β(t) = 0], so ¬BarC(Dβm).
Contradiction.
Conclude: ∃i < m∀j ≤ α0(i)[(i, j) ∈ E
α1m
⊆ Eα1 ]. 
Theorem 5.6. BIM proves: FT↔ Σ01-
←−−−−−
ACω,<ω and ¬!FT↔ ¬!(Σ01-
←−−−−−
ACω,<ω).
Proof. These statements follow from Lemma 5.5 and Theorem 5.4. 
5.7. No Double Negation Shift.
Assume ¬!FT. Using ¬!(Σ01-
←−−−−
ACω,2), find α such that ∀γ ∈ C∃n[
(
n, γ(n)
)
∈ Eα]
and ¬∃n∀m < 2[(n,m) ∈ Eα].
Then, for each n, ¬∀m < 2[(n,m) ∈ Eα] and: ¬∀m < 2[¬¬
(
(n,m) ∈ Eα
)
] and
¬¬∃m < 2[(n,m) /∈ Eα].
We thus see: ∀n¬¬∃m < 2[(n,m) /∈ Eα].
Also: ¬∃γ ∈ C∀n[
(
n, γ(n)
)
/∈ Eα].
Using Π01-ACω,2, we conclude: ¬∀n∃m < 2[(n,m) /∈ Eα].
We thus see that if we assume both ¬!FT andΠ01-ACω,2 we can findΠ
0
1-subsets
P = {n | (n, 0) /∈ Eα} and Q = {n | (n, 1) /∈ Eα} of N such that
∀n[¬¬
(
P (n) ∨Q(n)
)
] and ¬∀n[P (n) ∨Q(n)].
S. Kuroda’s scheme of Double Negation Shift
∀n[¬¬T (n)]→ ¬¬∀n[T (n)]
(see [17, page 45] and [8, page 105]) thus is refuted.
In [26, vol. I, Chapter 4, Proposition 3.4, Corollary 1], the same conclusion is
obtained in HA from CT0.
6. ACω,N , some special cases
6.1. Σ01-Second Axiom of Countable Choice, Σ
0
1-ACω,N :
∀α[∀n∃γ[γ ∈ Gαn ]→ ∃γ∀n[γ
n ∈ Gαn ]].
Theorem 6.1. BIM ⊢ Σ01-ACω,N .
Proof. Assume ∀n∃γ[γ ∈ Gαn ]. Then ∀n∃s[αn(s) 6= 0].
Find δ such that ∀n[δ(n) = µs[αn(s) 6= 0]]. Find γ such that ∀n[γn = δ(n) ∗ 0].
Note: ∀n[γn ∈ Gαn ]. 
6.2. Π01-Second Axiom of Countable Choice, Π
0
1-ACω,N :
∀α[∀n∃γ[γ /∈ Gα.]→ ∃γ∀n[γ
n /∈ Gαn ]].
Theorem 6.2. BIM ⊢ Π01-ACω,N → Π
0
1-ACω,ω.
Proof. Let α be given such that ∀n∃m[(n,m) /∈ Eα]. Define β such that
∀n∀a[βn(a) 6= 0↔ ∃m∃b∃p ≤ a[α(p) = (n,m) + 1 ∧ a = 〈m〉 ∗ b]].
Note: ∀n∀m[(n,m) ∈ Eα ↔ ∀γ[〈m〉 ∗ γ ∈ Gβn ]].
Conclude: ∀n∃γ[γ /∈ Gβn ]. Using Π01-ACω,N , find γ such that ∀n[γ
n /∈ Gβn ].
Define δ such that ∀n[δ(n) = γn(0)] and note: ∀n[
(
n, δ(n)
)
/∈ Eα]. 
One may conclude that Π01-ACω,N is unprovable in BIM, see Subsection 4.8.
Not every Π01 subset of N is a spread, see Lemma 2.6. For spreads, which are a
special kind of Π01 sets, countable choice is easier:
Theorem 6.3. BIM ⊢ ∀α[Spr(α) ∧ ∀nγ[〈n〉 ∗ γ /∈ Gα]]→ ∃γ∀n[〈n〉 ∗ γ /∈ Gα]].
Proof. Let α be given such that Spr(α) and ∀n∃γ[〈n〉∗γ /∈ Gα]]. Define γ as follows:
for each n, for each m, γn(m) = µk[α
(
〈n〉 ∗ (γnm) ∗ 〈k〉
)
= 0. 
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6.3. Axiom Scheme of Countable Compact Choice, ACω,C :
∀n∃γ ∈ C[R(n, γ)]→ ∃γ ∈ C∀n[R(n, γn)].
Here is a restricted version of ACω,C :
6.4. Π01-Axiom of Countable Compact Choice, Π
0
1-ACω,C :
∀α[∀n∃γ ∈ C[γ /∈ Gαn ]→ ∃γ ∈ C∀n[γ
n /∈ Gαn ]]
Theorem 6.4. BIM ⊢ Π01-ACω,C → Π
0
1-ACω,2.
Proof. Let α be given such that ∀n∃i < 2[(n, i) /∈ Eα]. Define β such that
∀n∀a[βn(a) 6= 0↔ ∃i < 2∃b ∈ Bin∃m ≤ a[α(m) = (n, i) + 1 ∧ a = 〈i〉 ∗ b]].
Note: ∀n∀i < 2[(n, i) ∈ Eα ↔ ∀γ ∈ C[〈i〉 ∗ γ ∈ Gβn ]].
Conclude: ∀n∃γ ∈ C[γ /∈ Gβn ]. Using Π01-ACω,C , find γ such that ∀n[γ
n /∈ Gβn ].
Define δ such that ∀n[δ(n) = γn(0)] and note: ∀n[
(
n, δ(n)
)
/∈ Eα]. 
We may conclude: Π01-ACω,C is unprovable in BIM, see Subsection 4.8.
The treatment of real numbers in BIM is sketched in Subsubsection 2.2.6.
6.5. Π01-ACω,[0,1]:
∀α[∀n∃γ ∈ [0, 1][γ /∈ Hαn ]→ ∃γ ∈ [0, 1]
N∀n[γn /∈ Hαn ]]
Theorem 6.5. BIM ⊢ Π01-ACω,C ↔ Π
0
1-ACω,[0,1]
Proof. First assume Π01-ACω,C.
Assume: ρ : C → [0, 1] and ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]∃γ[δ =R ρ|γ]. Assume: ψ : N → N and
∀α∀γ ∈ C[γ ∈ Gψ|α ↔ ρ|γ ∈ Hα].
Let α be given such that ∀n∃δ ∈ [0, 1][δ /∈ Hαn ]. Then ∀n∃γ ∈ C[ρ|γ /∈ Hαn ] and
∀n∃γ ∈ C[γ /∈ Gψ|(αn)]. Find β such that ∀n[β
n = ψ|(αn)]. Find γ in C such that
∀n[γn /∈ Gβn ] and, therefore, ∀n[γn /∈ Gψ|(αn)]. Define δ such that ∀n[δ
n = ρ|(γn)]
and conclude: ∀n[δn /∈ Hαn ].
Now assume Π01-ACω,[0,1].
For each s in S, for each i < 5, define: πi5(s) := (
5−i
5 s
′+Q
i
5s
′′, 5−i−15 s
′+Q
i+1
5 s
′′).
Define ε such that ε(〈 〉) = (0Q, 1Q) and, for all a in Bin, ε(a ∗ 〈0〉) = π15
(
ε(a)
)
and
ε(s ∗ 〈1〉) = π35
(
ε(a)
)
. Define τ : C → [0, 1] such that ∀γ ∈ C[(τ |γ)(n) = ε(γn)].
Then τ : C →֒ [0, 1], that is: ∀γ ∈ C∀ζ ∈ C[γ # ζ → τ |γ #R τ |ζ].
Find ν : N → N such that ∀α∀γ ∈ C[γ ∈ Gα ↔ τ |γ ∈ Hν|α] and
∀α∀δ ∈ [0, 1][δ /∈ Hν|α → ∃γ ∈ C[τ |γ =R δ]].
Let α be given such that ∀n∃γ ∈ C[γ /∈ Gαn ].
Conclude: ∀n∃γ ∈ C[τ |γ /∈ Hχ|(αn)] and: ∀n∃δ ∈ [0, 1][δ /∈ Hχ|(αn)].
Define β such that ∀n[βn = χ|(αn)]. Find δ in [0, 1]N such that ∀n[δn /∈ Hβn ] and,
therefore, ∀n[δn /∈ Hχ|(αn)] and ∀n∃γ ∈ C[τ |γ =R δ
n].
Note: ∀n∀a ∈ Bin [ε′′(a ∗ 〈0〉) <Q ε′(a ∗ 〈1〉)].
Define γ in C such that, for all n,m, p,
if p = µq[ε′′(γnm ∗ 〈0〉) <Q (δn)′(q) ∨ (δn)′′(q) <Q ε′(γnm ∗ 〈1〉)],
then γn(m) = 0↔ (δn)′′(p) <Q ε′(γnm ∗ 〈1〉).
One may prove: ∀n[δn = τ |γn] and conclude: ∀n[γn /∈ Gαn ]. 
7. Contrapositions of some special cases of ACω,N
The axiom ∆01-
←−−−−−
ACω,N implies ∆
0
1-
←−−−−
ACω,ω and therefore LPO. Let us consider
an Axiom Scheme of Reverse Countable Compact Choice:
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7.1.
←−−−−
ACω,C: ∀γ ∈ C∃n[R(n, γn)]→ ∃n∀γ ∈ C[R(n, γ)].
In [29] it is shown that
←−−−−
ACω,C is a consequence of the First Axiom of Continuous
Choice ACN ,N and FAN.
We now require the relation R to be Σ01 and obtain the Σ
0
1-Axiom of Reverse
Countable Compact Choice:
7.2. Σ01-
←−−−−
ACω,C : ∀α[∀γ ∈ C∃n[γn ∈ Gαn ]→ ∃n[C ⊆ Gαn ]].
We also introduce a strong negation:
7.3. ¬!
(
Σ01-
←−−−−
ACω,C): ∃α[∀γ ∈ C∃n[γn ∈ Gαn ] ∧ ¬∃n[C ⊆ Gαn ]].
We introduce a ‘real’ version:
7.4. Σ01-
←−−−−−−
ACω,[0,1]: ∀α[∀γ ∈ [0, 1]
N∃n[γn ∈ Hαn ]→ ∃n[[0, 1] ⊆ Hαn ]].
and a strong negation:
7.5. ¬!(Σ01-
←−−−−−−
ACω,[0,1]): ∃α[∀γ ∈ [0, 1]
N∃n[γn ∈ Hαn ] ∧ ¬∃n[[0, 1] ⊆ Hαn ]].
The treatment of real numbers in BIM is sketched in Subsubsection 2.2.6.
Lemma 7.1. BIM proves:
(i) FT→ Σ01-
←−−−−
ACω,C and ¬!(Σ01-
←−−−−
ACω,C)→ ¬!FT.
(ii) Σ01-
←−−−−
ACω,C → Σ01-
←−−−−−−
ACω,[0,1] and ¬!(Σ
0
1-
←−−−−−−
ACω,[0,1])→ ¬!(Σ
0
1-
←−−−−
ACω,C)
(iii) Σ01-
←−−−−−−
ACω,[0,1] → Σ
0
1-
←−−−−
ACω,2 and ¬!(Σ01-
←−−−−
ACω,2)→ ¬!(Σ01-
←−−−−−−
ACω,[0,1])
Proof. (i) We prove, in BIM: for each α, there exists β such that
∀γ ∈ C∃n[γn ∈ Gαn ]→ BarC(Dβ) and ∃m[BarC(Dβm)]→ ∃n[C ⊆ Gαn ].
The two promised statements then follow easily.
Let α be given. Define β such that, for every s,
β(s) 6= 0↔
(
s ∈ Bin ∧ ∃n < length(s)∃p ≤ length(sn)[αn(snp) 6= 0]
)
.
Assume: ∀γ ∈ C∃n∃p[αn(γnp) 6= 0]. Clearly ∀γ ∈ C∃n[β(γn) 6= 0], that is:
BarC(Dβ).
Let m be given such that BarC(Dβm). Suppose there is no n < m such that
BarC(Dαnm). For each n < m, there exists u in Bin such that length(u) = m and
u does not meet Dαn . Let s be an element of Bin such that length(s) = m and, for
each n < m, sn does not meetDαn . Note: s does not meetDβ . Contradiction. Thus
we see there must exist n < m such that every s in Bin such that length(s) = m
meets Dαn . Conclude: ∃n[C ⊆ Gαn ].
(ii) We prove, in BIM: for each α, there exists β such that
∀γ ∈ [0, 1]N∃n[γn ∈ Hαn ]→ ∀γ ∈ C∃n[γ
n ∈ Gβn ] and
∃n[C ⊆ Gβn ]→ ∃n[[0, 1] ⊆ Hαn ].
Assume ρ : C → [0, 1] and ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]∃γ ∈ C[ρ|γ =R δ] and ψ ∈ Fun and
∀β∀γ ∈ C[γ ∈ Gψ|β ↔ ρ|γ ∈ Hβ ]. Let α be given. Define β such that, for every n,
βn = ψ|(αn).
Assume ∀γ ∈ [0, 1]N∃n[γn ∈ Hαn ]. Then ∀γ ∈ C∃n[ρ|(γ
n) ∈ Hαn ] and: ∀γ ∈
C∃n[γn ∈ Gψ|(αn)] and: ∀γ ∈ C∃n[γ
n ∈ Gβn ].
Let n be given such that such that C ⊆ Gβn = Gψ|(αn). Note: ∀γ ∈ C[ρ|γ ∈ Hαn ]
and, therefore: [0, 1] ⊆ Hαn .
(iii) We prove, in BIM: for each α, there exists β such that
∀γ ∈ C∃n[
(
n, γ(n)
)
∈ Eα]→ ∀γ ∈ [0, 1]
N∃n[γn ∈ Hβn ] and
∃n[[0, 1] ⊆ Hβn ]→ ∃n∀i < 2[(n, i) ∈ Eα].
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Let α be given. Define β such that ∀n∀s ∈ S[βn(s) 6= 0↔
∃i < s[
(
α(i) = (n, 0) + 1 ∧ s′′ <Q 1Q
)
∨
(
α(i) = (n, 1) + 1 ∧ s′′ <Q 1Q
)
]].
Note ∀n[
(
(n, 0) ∈ Eα ↔ [0, 1) ⊆ Hβn ]
)
∧
(
(n, 1) ∈ Eα ↔ (0, 1] ⊆ Hβn
)
].
Assume: ∀γ ∈ C∃n[
(
n, γ(n)
)
∈ Eα], and δ ∈ [0, 1]N.
Define ε such that ∀n[ε(n) = µm[0Q <Q
(
δn(m)
)′
∨
(
δn(m)
)′′
<Q 1Q].
Define γ in C such that ∀n[γ(n) = 0↔
(
δn(ε(n))
)′′
<Q 1Q].
Note: ∀n[γ(n) = 1→ 0R <R δn].
Find n such that
(
n, γ(n)
)
∈ Eα and conclude:
either : γ(n) = 0 and δn <R 1R and [0, 1) ⊆ Hβn , so δn ∈ Hβn ,
or : γ(n) = 1 and 0R <R δ
n and (0, 1] ⊆ Hβn , so, again, δn ∈ Hβn .
Conclude: ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]N∃n[δn ∈ Hβn ].
Let n be given such that [0, 1] ⊆ Hβn . Conclude: ∀i < 2[(n, i) ∈ Eα]. 
Theorem 7.2. (i) BIM ⊢ FT↔ Σ01-
←−−−−
ACω,C ↔ Σ01-
←−−−−−−
ACω,[0,1].
(ii) BIM ⊢ ¬!FT↔ ¬!(Σ01-
←−−−−
ACω,C)↔ ¬!(Σ01-
←−−−−−−
ACω,[0,1]).
Proof. These statements follow from Lemmas 7.1 and 5.3. 
8. On the Contraposition of Twofold Compact Choice
We introduce a limited version of Σ01-
←−−−−
ACω,C :
8.1. Σ01-
←−−−−
AC2,C : ∀α[∀γ ∈ C∃i < 2[γi ∈ Gαi ]→ ∃i < 2[C ⊆ Gαi ]].
This statement should be called the Σ01-Axiom of Reverse Twofold Compact
Choice. It is a reversal of a special case of the following scheme:
∀α[∀i < 2∃γ ∈ C[R(i, γ]→ ∃γ ∈ C∀i < 2[R(i, γi)]].
and the latter scheme is provable in BIM.
Theorem 8.1. BIM + Π01-ACω,2 ⊢ FT↔ Σ
0
1-
←−−−−
AC2,C.
Proof. First assume FT. Use Theorem 7.2 and conclude: Σ01-
←−−−−
ACω,C .
Note: Σ01-
←−−−−
ACω,C → Σ01-
←−−−−
AC2,C .
Now assume: Σ01-
←−−−−
AC2,C .
Let α be given such that BarC(Dα). We have to prove: ∃m[BarC(Dαm)].
We first prove the following statement, called: LLPOα:
∀ε[∀p[2p = µm[ε(m) 6= 0]→ BarC(Dαp)] ∨
∀p[2p+ 1 = µm[ε(m) 6= 0]→ BarC(Dαp)]].
Let ε be given. Define η such that, for each p,
(1) if 0(2p+ 2) ⊏ ε, then η0(p) = η1(p) = α(p), and,
(2) if 2p = µm[ε(m) 6= 0], then ∀m ≥ p[η0(m) = 0 ∧ η1(m) = α(m)], and
(3) if 2p+ 1 = µm[ε(m) 6= 0], then ∀m ≥ p[η1(m) = 0 ∧ η0(m) = α(m)].
Note: if η0 # α, then η1 = α.
Let γ in C be given. Find n such that α(γ0n) 6= 0. Either: η0(γ0n) = α(γ0n) 6= 0
or: η0 # α and η1 = α and ∃m[η1(γ1m) = α(γ1m) 6= 0].
We thus see: ∀γ ∈ C[γ0 ∈ Gη0 ∨ γ
1 ∈ Gη1 ].
Use Σ10-
←−−−−
AC2,C and conclude: ∃i < 2[C ⊆ Gηi ].
First assume: C ⊆ Gη0 , that is: BarC(Dη0). Assume: 2p = µm[ε(m) 6= 0]. Note:
∀m ≥ p[η0(m) = 0]. Conclude: BarC(Dη0p) and: BarC(Dαp).
We thus see: ∀p[2p = µm[ε(m) 6= 0]→ BarC(Dαp)].
Now assume: C ⊆ Gη1 . Conclude, by a similar argument:
∀p[2p+ 1 = µm[ε(m) = 0]→ BarC(Dαp)].
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Assume: s ∈ Bin . Define ε such that, ∀i < 2∀n[ε(2n+i) 6= 0↔ BarC∩s∗〈i〉(Dαn)].
Distinguish two cases.
Case (1). ∀p[2p = µm[ε(m) 6= 0]→ BarC(Dαp)].
Assume we find n such that BarC∩s∗〈0〉(Dαn). Then ε(2n) 6= 0. Find p :=
µj[ε(j) 6= 0]. Find q ≤ n such that either p = 2q or p = 2q + 1. Either p = 2q and
BarC(Dαq), or p = 2q + 1 and BarC∩s∗〈1〉(Dαq). In both cases: BarC∩s∗〈1〉(Dαn).
We thus see: ∀n[BarC∩s∗〈0〉(Dαn)→ BarC∩s∗〈1〉(Dαn)].
Case (2). ∀p[(2p+ 1) = µm[ε(m) 6= 0]→ BarC(Dαp)
)
]. We now conclude, by a
similar argument: ∀n[BarC∩s∗〈1〉(Dαn)→ BarC∩s∗〈0〉(Dαn)].
We thus see: ∀s ∈ Bin∃i < 2∀n[BarC∩s∗〈1−i〉(Dαn) → BarC∩s∗〈i〉(Dαn)]. Use
Π01-ACω,2 and find γ in C such that
∀s ∈ Bin∀n[BarC∩s∗〈1−γ(s)〉(Dαn)→ BarC∩s∗〈γ(s)〉(Dαn)].
Observe that, for each s in Bin , for all n, if BarC∩s∗〈1−γ(s)〉(Dαn), then also
BarC∩s∗〈γ(s)〉(Dαn), and, therefore, BarC∩s(Dαn).
Define δ in C such that, for each n, δ(n) = 1−γ(δn). Find p such that α(δp) 6= 0
and define n := δp+1. Note: BarC∩δp(Dαn). One may prove, by backwards induc-
tion: for each j ≤ p, BarC∩δj(Dαn). For assume j + 1 ≤ n and BarC∩δ(j+1)(Dαn).
As δ(j + 1) = δj ∗ 〈1 − γ(δj)〉, one may conclude: BarC∩δ(j)(Dαn). After n steps
we obtain the conclusion: BarC(Dαn). 
We introduce a ‘real’ version of Σ01-
←−−−−
AC2,C :
8.2. Σ01-
←−−−−−−
AC2,[0,1]:
∀α[∀δ ∈ [0, 1]2∃i < 2[δi ∈ Hαi ]→ ∃i < 2[[0, 1] ⊆ Hαi ]].
Theorem 8.2. BIM ⊢ Σ01-
←−−−−
AC2,C ↔ Σ01-
←−−−−−−
AC2,[0,1].
Proof. 4 First assume: Σ01-
←−−−−
AC2,C .
Assume: ρ : C → [0, 1] and ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]∃γ[δ =R ρ|γ]. Assume: ψ : N → N and
∀α∀γ ∈ C[γ ∈ Gψ|α ↔ ρ|γ ∈ Hα].
Let α be given such that ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]2∃i < 2[δi ∈ Hαi ]. Define β such that,
for both i < 2, βi = ψ|(α)i. Then ∀γ ∈ C∃i < 2[ρ|γi ∈ Hαi ] and, therefore:
∀γ ∈ C∃i < 2[γi ∈ Gβi ]. Find i < 2 such that C ⊆ Gβi . Conclude: [0, 1] ⊆ Hαi .
Now assume: Σ01-
←−−−−−−
AC2,[0,1].
For each s in S, for each i < 5, define: πi5(s) := (
5−i
5 s
′+Q
i
5s
′′, 5−i−15 s
′+Q
i+1
5 s
′′).
Define ε such that ε(〈 〉) = (0Q, 1Q) and, for all a in Bin, ε(a ∗ 〈0〉) = π15
(
ε(a)
)
and
ε(s ∗ 〈1〉) = π35
(
ε(a)
)
. Define τ : C → [0, 1] such that ∀γ ∈ C[(τ |γ)(n) = ε(γn)].
Then τ : C →֒ [0, 1], that is: ∀γ ∈ C∀ζ ∈ C[γ # ζ → τ |γ #R τ |ζ].
Find ν : N → N such that ∀α∀γ ∈ C[γ ∈ Gα ↔ τ |γ ∈ Hν|α] and
∀α∀δ ∈ [0, 1][δ /∈ Hν|α → ∃γ ∈ C[τ |γ =R δ]].
Let α be given such that ∀γ ∈ C∃i < 2[γi ∈ Gαi ].
Let δ in [0, 1]2 be given. Define γ in C such that, for all i < 2 for all m, p,
if p = µq[ε′′(γiγm ∗ 〈0〉) <Q (δn)′(q) ∨ (δn)′′(q) <Q ε′(γim ∗ 〈1〉)],
then γi(m) = 0↔ (δn)′′(p) <Q ε′(γm ∗ 〈1〉).
One may prove: ∀i < 2[δi = τ |γi] and conclude: ∃i < 2[δi = τ |γi ∈ Hν|(αi)] .
Conclude: ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]2∃i < 2[δi ∈ Hν|(αi)].
Applying Σ01-
←−−−−−−
AC2,[0,1], find i < 2 such that [0, 1] ⊆ Hν|(αi).
Conclude: ∀γ ∈ C[τ |γ ∈ Hν|(αi)] and: C ⊆ Gαi . 
Corollary 8.3. BIM +Π01-ACω,2 ⊢ FT↔ Σ
0
1-
←−−−−−−
AC2,[0,1].
4We use some notions defined in Subsubsection 2.2.7.
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Proof. Use Theorem 8.1. 
8.3. Some logical consequences.
In this Subsection, we want to formulate the result of Theorem 8.1 in model-
theoretic terms and draw an even sharper conclusion.
For every δ, we define a proposition Prδ, as follows: Prδ := ∃n[δ(n) 6= 0].
Tarski’s truth definition makes sense intuitionistically as well as classically.
For every structure A = (A, . . .), for every sentence φ in the elementary language
of the structure A we write:
A |= φ
if the sentence φ is true in the structure A. More generally,
for every structure A = (A, . . .), for every formula φ = φ(x0, x1, . . . , xn−1) in the
elementary language of the structure A, for all a0, a1, . . . , an−1 in A, we write:
A |= φ[a0, a1, . . . , an−1]
if the formula φ is true in the structure A, provided we interpret the individual
variables x0, x1, . . . , xn−1 by a0, a1, . . . , an−1, respectively.
Theorem 8.4. The following statements are equivalent in BIM:
(i) ∀α[(C,Gα0 , P rα1) |= ∀x[P(x) ∨ A]→ (∀x[P(x)] ∨ A)].
(ii) ∀α[(C,Gα0 ,Gα1) |= ∀x[P(x) ∨ Q(x)]→ (∀x[P(x)] ∨ ∃x[Q(x)])].
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii). Let α be given such that (C,Gα0 ,Gα1) |= ∀x[P(x) ∨ Q(x)]. Note:
(C,Gα0 ,Gα1) |= ∀x[P(x) ∨ ∃y[Q(y)]]. Define β such that β
0 = α0 and ∀n[β1(n) 6=
0 ↔
(
α1(n) 6= 0 ∧ n ∈ Bin
)
]. Note: (C,Gβ0 , P rβ1) |= ∀x[P(x) ∨ A], and thus,
according to (i): (C,Gβ0 , P rβ1) |= ∀x[P(x)] ∨ A, and therefore: (C,Gα0 ,Gα1) |=
∀x[P(x)] ∨ ∃x[Q(x)].
(ii) ⇒ (i). Let α be given such that (C,Gα0 , P rα1) |= ∀x[P(x) ∨ A]. Define β
such that β0 = α0 and ∀n[β1(n) 6= 0 ↔
(
∃i < n[α1(i) 6= 0] ∧ n ∈ Bin
)
].
Note that, for each γ in C, γ ∈ Gβ1 if and only if Prα1 . Therefore, (C,Gβ0 ,Gβ1) |=
∀x[P(x) ∨ Q(x)] and, according to (ii): (C,Gβ0 ,Gβ1) |= ∀x[P(x)] ∨ ∃x[Q(x)], and thus:
(C,Gα0 , P rα1) |= ∀x[P(x)] ∨ A. 
Theorem 8.5. The following statements are equivalent in BIM + Π01-ACω,2:
(i) FT.
(ii) ∀α[(C,Gα0 ,Gα1) |= ∀x∀y[P(x) ∨ Q(y)]→ (∀x[P(x)] ∨ ∀y[Q(y)])].
(iii) ∀α[(C,Gα0 , P rα1) |= ∀x[P(x) ∨ A]→ (∀x[P(x)] ∨ A)].
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii). See Theorem 8.1.
(ii) ⇒ (iii). Let α be given such that (C,Gα0 , P rα1) |= ∀x[P(x) ∨ A]. Find β
such that β0 = α0 and ∀p[β1(p) 6= 0 ↔ (p ∈ Bin ∧ ∃i < p[α1(i) 6= 0])]. Note
∀γ ∈ C[γ ∈ Gβ1 ↔ Prα1 ]. Therefore: (C,Gβ0 ,Gβ1) |= ∀x∀y[P(x) ∨ Q(y)]. Conclude:
(C,Gβ0 ,Gβ1) |= ∀x[P(x)] ∨ ∀y[Q(y)] and therefore: (C,Gα0 , P rα1) |= ∀x[P(x)] ∨ A.
(iii) ⇒ (i). Assume (iii). We want to prove FT.
Let α be given such that BarC(Dα). We have to prove: ∃n[BarC(Dαn)].
We first prove the following statement:
LPOα : ∀ε[∀p[0(2p+ 2) ⊥ ε→ BarC(Dαp)] ∨ ∃n[ε(n) 6= 0]]
Let ε be given. Define η in C such that η1 = ε, and, for each p, if 0(2p + 2) ⊏ ε,
then η0(p) = α(p), and, if 0(2p + 2) ⊥ ε, then η0(p) = 0. Note: if η0 # α, then
∃p[ε(n) = η1(p) 6= 0].
Let γ in C be given. Find n such that α(γn) 6= 0. Either: η0(γn) = α(γn) 6= 0 or:
η0 # α and ∃m[η1(m) 6= 0]. We thus see: ∀γ ∈ C[(∃n[η0(γn) 6= 0]) ∨ (∃m[η1(m) 6=
0])]. Use (iii) and conclude: ∀γ ∈ C∃n[η0(γn) = 1] ∨ ∃m[η1(m) 6= 0].
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Assume: ∀γ ∈ C∃n[η0(γn) 6= 0], that is: BarC(Dη0). Let p be given such that
0(2p+ 2) ⊥ ε. Note ∀m ≥ p[η0(m) = 0]. Conclude: BarC(Dη0p) and: BarC(Dαp).
We thus see: ∀p[0(2p+ 2) ⊥ ε→ BarC(Dαp)].
Assume: ∃n[η1(n) 6= 0], Then, of course: ∃n[ε(n) 6= 0].
We now prove:
LLPOα : ∀ε[∀p[2p = µm[ε(m) 6= 0]→ BarC(Dαp)] ∨
∀p[2p+ 1 = µm[ε(m) 6= 0]→ BarC(Dαp)]]
Let ε be given. Use LPOα and distinguish two cases.
Case (1). ∀p[0(2p + 2) ⊥ ε → BarC(Dαp)]. Then ∀p[2p = µm[ε(m) 6= 0] →
BarC(Dαp)], and also ∀p[2p+ 1 = µp[ε(m) 6= 0]→ BarC(Dαp)].
Case (2). ∃n[ε(n) 6= 0]. Define m := µn[ε(n) 6= 0]. Find q such that m = 2q or
m = 2q + 1. If m = 2q + 1, then ∀p[2p = µm[ε(m) 6= 0]→ BarC(Dαp)]. If m = 2q,
then ∀p[2p+ 1 = µm[ε(m) 6= 0]→ BarC(Dαp)].
From this point on, one may follow the argument given in the proof of Theorem
8.1(ii)⇒(i) in order to obtain the conclusion: ∃n[BarC(Dαn)]. 
The sentences mentioned in Theorems 8.4 and 8.5 are true in every structure
({0, 1, . . . , n}, P,Q,A) where n is a natural number, P,Q are arbitrary subsets of
{0, 1, . . . , n} and A is an arbitrary proposition, that is, these sentences hold in every
finite structure. They sometimes fail to be true in countable structures, as appears
from the next two theorems.
Theorem 8.6. The following statements are equivalent in BIM.
(i) LLPO.
(ii) ∀α[(N, Dα0 , Dα1) |= ∀x∀y[P(x) ∨ Q(y)]→ (∀x[P(x)] ∨ ∀y[Q(y)]).
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii). Let α be given. Define β such that ∀p∀i < 2[β(2p + i) = 0 ↔
αi(p) 6= 0]. Assume: (N, Dα0 , Dα1) |= ∀x∀y[P(x) ∨ Q(y)]. Conclude: ∀p∀q[β(2p) =
0 ∨ β(2q + 1) = 0]. Apply LLPO and distinguish two cases.
Case (1). ∀p[2p+1 6= µm[β(m) 6= 0]]. Assume we find p such that β(2p+1) 6= 0.
Determine q such that q ≤ p and β(2q) 6= 0. Contradiction.
Conclude: ∀p[β(2p+ 1) = 0] and: Dα1 = N.
Case (2). ∀p[2p 6= µm[β(m) 6= 0]]. Then, for similar reasons: Dα0 = N.
In both cases: (N, Dα0 , Dα1) |= ∀x[P(x)] ∨ ∀y[Q(y)].
(ii)⇒ (i). Let α be given. Define β such that, for each p, for both i < 2, βi(p) = 0
if and only if α(2p + i) = 0(2p + i) and α(2p + i) 6= 0. Note: (N, Dβ0 , Dβ1) |=
∀x∀y[P(x) ∨ Q(y)]. Conclude: (N, Dβ0 , Dβ1) |= ∀x[P(x)] ∨ ∀y[Q(y)].
Either: (N, Dβ0 , Dβ1) |= ∀x[P(x)] and: ∀p[α(2p) = 0(2p) → α(2p) = 0] or:
(N, Dβ0 , Dβ1) |= ∀y[Q(y)] and: ∀p[α(2p+1) = 0(2p+1)→ α(2p+1) = 0]. We thus
see: LLPO. 
Theorem 8.7. The following statements are equivalent in BIM.
(i) LPO.
(ii) ∀α[(N, Dα0 , Dα1) |= ∀x[P(x) ∨Q(x)]→ (∀x[P(x)] ∨ ∃x[Q(x)])].
(iii) ∀α[(N, Dα0 , P rα1) |= ∀x[P(x) ∨ A]→ (∀x[P(x)] ∨ A)].
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii). Let α be given such that (N, Dα0 , Dα1) |= ∀x[P(x) ∨ Q(x)]. Using
LPO, distinguish two cases. Either: ∀n[α0(n) 6= 0] and (N, Dα0 , Dα1) |= ∀x[P(x)],
or: ∃n[α0(n) = 0] and: ∃n[α1(n) 6= 0] and (N, Dα0 , Dα1) |= ∃x[Q(x)].
(i)⇒ (iii). Let α be given such that (N, Dα0 , P rα1) |= ∀x[P(x) ∨ A]. Using LPO,
distinguish two cases. Either: ∀n[α0(n) 6= 0] and (N, Dα0 , P rα1) |= ∀x[P(x)], or:
∃n[α0(n) = 0] and: ∃n[α1(n) 6= 0] and (N, Dα0 , P rα1) |= A.
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(ii) ⇒ (i). Let α be given. Define β such that ∀n[β0(n) = 0 ↔ α(n) 6= 0] and
β1 = α. Note: (N, Dβ0 , Dβ1) |= ∀x[P(x) ∨ Q(x)]. Use (ii) and distinguish two cases.
Either: (N, Dβ0 , Dβ1) |= ∀x[P(x)] and ∀n[α(n) = 0] or: (N, Dβ0 , Dβ1) |= ∃x[Q(x)]
and ∃n[α(n) 6= 0]. We thus see: LPO.
(iii) ⇒ (i). Let α be given. Note: (N, Dα, P rα) |= ∀x[P(x) ∨ A]. Use (iii)
and distinguish two cases. Either: (N, Dα, P rα) |= ∀x[P(x)] and ∀n[α(n) = 0] or:
(N, Dα, P rα) |= A and ∃n[α(n) 6= 0]. We thus see: LPO. 
8.4. Similar conclusions for Kleene’s Alternative? Theorems 8.1 and 8.5 offer
us statements that are equivalent to FT in BIM + Π01-ACω,2. One might ask if
certain ‘natural’ strong negations of these statements are equivalent to ¬!FT in
BIM+Π01-ACω,2. The following example sheds some light upon this question.
According to Theorem 8.5(iii), BIM+Π01-ACω,2 proves that FT is equivalent to:
∀α[∀γ ∈ C∃n[α0(γn) = 1 ∨ α1(n) = 1]→ (∀γ ∈ C∃n[α0(γn) = 1] ∨ ∃n[α1(n) = 1])].
One might hope that BIM + Π01-ACω,2 proves that ¬!FT is equivalent to the
following statement, (∗):
∃α[∀γ ∈ C∃n[α0(γn) = 1∨α1(n) = 1] ∧ ¬(∀γ ∈ C∃n[α0(γn) = 1]∨∃n[α1(n) = 1])].
The formula (∗), however, leads to contradiction, if one assumes Markov’s Prin-
ciple MP: ∀α[¬¬∃n[α(n) = 1]→ ∃n[α(n) = 1]], in the following way:
Assume the second conjunct of (∗); : ¬(∀γ ∈ C∃n[α0(γn) = 1] ∨ ∃n[α1(n) = 1]).
Conclude: ¬∀γ ∈ C¬¬∃n[α0(γn) = 1] ∧ ¬∃n[α1(n) = 1] and:
¬¬∃γ ∈ C∀n[α0(γn) 6= 1] ∧ ∀n[α1(n) 6= 1], and:
¬¬∃γ ∈ C∀n[α0(γn) 6= 1 ∧ α1(n) 6= 1], and: ¬∀γ ∈ C∃n[α0(γn) = 1 ∨ α1(n) = 1].
This contradicts the first conjunct of (∗).
We know, on the other hand, that HA+ CT0 +MP is consistent, see [26, vol. I,
Chapter 4, Section 5], and that BIM +CT+ACω,ω may be interpreted in HA+CT0,
see also Subsection 4.8. We must conclude then, that the above-mentioned strong
negation of the statement in Theorem 8.5(iii) is unprovable in BIM from ¬!FT.
9. The determinacy of finite and infinite games
We consider games of perfect information for players I, II. First finite games,
then games with finitely many moves where the players may choose out of infinitely
many alternatives, and then games of infinite length. In the last Subsection we
prove: in BIM, FT is an equivalent of the Intuitionistic Determinacy Theorem:
every subset of (ω × 2)ω is weakly determinate.
9.1. Finite games.
9.1.1. Finite Choice and a contraposition of Finite Choice.
Lemma 9.1. BIM proves the following scheme:
∀n[A(n) ∨B]→ ∀m[∀n < m[A(n)] ∨ B]
Proof. The proof is straightforward, by induction. 
Lemma 9.2. BIM proves the following schemes:
(i) ∀k[∀n < k∃m[R(n,m)]→ ∃s∀n < k[R
(
n, s(n)
)
]].
(ii) ∀k∀l[∀s : k → l∃n < k[R
(
n, s(n)
)
]→ ∃n < k∀m < l[R(n,m)]].
Proof. (i) The proof is by induction on k and left to the reader.
(ii) The proof is by induction on k and uses Lemma 9.1. Note that there is
nothing to prove if k = 0. Now assume the statement holds for a certain k.
Assume ∀s : (k + 1)→ l∃n < k + 1[R
(
n, s(n)
)
]. Note:
∀j < l∀s : k → l∃n < k[R
(
n, s(n)
)
∨ R(k, j)].
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Using the induction hypothesis, we conclude:
∀j < l∃n < k∀m < l[R(n,m) ∨ R(k, j)]
and, ∀j < l[∃n < k∀m < l[R(n,m)] ∨ R(k, j)],
and, by Lemmma 9.1: ∃n < k∀m < l[R(n,m)] ∨ ∀j < l[R(k, j)],
that is: ∃n < k + 1∀m < l[R(n,m)]. 
9.1.2. Finite games. We want to study finite and infinite games for players I and
II of perfect information. We first consider finite games: there are finitely many
moves, and for each move there are only finitely many alternatives.
Let n, l be given such that l > 0 and assume X ⊆ Seq(n, l).
Players I and II play the I-game for X in Seq(n, l) and the II-game for X in
Seq(n, l) in the same way, as follows. First, player I chooses i0 < l, then player II
chooses i1 < l, and they continue until a finite sequence 〈i0, i1, . . . , in−1〉 of length
n has been formed. Player I wins the play 〈i0, i1, . . . , in−1〉 in the I-game for X if
and only if 〈i0, i1, . . . , in−1〉 ∈ X . Player II wins the play 〈i0, i1, . . . , in−1〉 in the
II-game for X if and only if 〈i0, i1, . . . , in−1〉 ∈ X .
We define ψ such that, for each l > 0,
ψ(0, l) = 1 ∧ ∀n[ψ(n+ 1, l) = µm∀c : l → ψ(n, l)[c < m].
We define: X ⊆ Seq(n, l) is I-determinate in Seq(n, l), DetISeq(n,l)(X),
if and only if ∀c < ψ(n, l)∃s[s ∈II c ∧ s ∈ X ]→ ∃b∀s ∈ Seq(n, l)[s ∈I b→ s ∈ X ],
and: X ⊆ Seq(n, l) is II-determinate in Seq(n, l), DetIISeq(n,l)(X),
if and only if ∀c < ψ(n, l)∃s[s ∈I c ∧ s ∈ X ]→ ∃b∀s ∈ Seq(n, l)[s ∈II b→ s ∈ X ].
Theorem 9.3 (Determinacy of finite games). For every n, for every l > 0, for
every X ⊆ Seq(n, l), DetISeq(n,l)(X) and Det
II
Seq(n,l)(X).
Proof. The proof is by induction on n. If n = 0 the statements: X is I-determinate
in Seq(0, l) and: X is II-determinate in Seq(0, l) both assert: if 〈 〉 ∈ X, then
〈 〉 ∈ X and thus are obviously true.
Now assume the theorem has been established for a certain n. We prove that
the theorem is also true for n+ 1.
Let X ⊆ Seq(n+ 1, l) be given.
First, assume: ∀c < ψ(n+ 1, l)∃s[s ∈II c ∧ s ∈ X ], or, equivalently:
∀c < ψ(n+ 1, l)∃k < l∃s[s ∈I ck ∧ 〈k〉 ∗ s ∈ X ].
Conclude: ∀c : l → ψ(n, l)∃k < l∃s[s ∈I c(k) ∧ 〈k〉 ∗ s ∈ X ].
Use Lemma 9.2(ii) and find k < l such that ∀b < ψ(n, l)∃s[s ∈I b ∧ 〈k〉 ∗ s ∈ X ].
Use the induction hypothesis and find c < ψ(n, l) such that
∀s ∈ Seq(n, l)[s ∈II c→ 〈k〉 ∗ s ∈ X ].
Define b < ψ(n+ 1, l) such that b(〈 〉) = k and bk = c.
Note: ∀s ∈ Seq(n+ 1, l)[s ∈I b→ s ∈ X ].
We thus see that X is I-determinate.
Next, assume: ∀b < ψ(n+ 1, l)∃s[s ∈I b ∧ s ∈ X ], or, equivalently:
∀b < ψ(n+ 1, l)∃s[s ∈II bb(〈 〉) ∧ 〈b(〈 〉)〉 ∗ s ∈ X ].
Note: ∀k < l∀c < ψ(n, l)∃b < ψ(n+ 1, l)[b(〈 〉) = k ∧ bk = c].
We thus see: ∀k < l∀c < ψ(n, l)∃s[s ∈II c ∧ 〈k〉 ∗ s ∈ X ].
Use the induction hypothesis and conclude:
∀k < l∃b < ψ(n, l)∀s ∈ Seq(n, l)[s ∈I b→ 〈k〉 ∗ s ∈ X ].
Use Lemma 9.2(i) and find c < ψ(n+ 1, l) such that
∀k < l∀s ∈ Seq(n, l)[s ∈I ck → 〈k〉 ∗ s ∈ X ].
Note: ∀s ∈ Seq(n+ 1, l)[s ∈II c→ s ∈ X ].
We thus see that X is II-determinate. 
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9.1.3. Comparison with the classical theorem. Note that, in classical mathematics,
the I-determinacy of finite games is stated as follows:
For every n, for every l, for every X ⊆ Seq(n, l),
either : ∃c < ψ(n, l)∀s ∈ Seq(n, l)[s ∈II c→ s /∈ X ],
or : ∃b < ψ(n, l)∀s ∈ Seq(n, l)[s ∈I b→ s ∈ X ],
that is: either player II has a strategy ensuring that the result of the game will
not be in X , or player I has a strategy ensuring that it does.
Taken constructively, this statement fails to be true already in the case n = 0,
because it then implies: for every subset X of {〈 〉}, either 〈 〉 /∈ X or 〈 〉 ∈ X , and
therefore, for any proposition P , ¬P ∨ P , the principle of the excluded third.
9.2. Infinitely many alternatives.
9.2.1. Infinitely many alternatives for player II.
Let X ⊆ 2 × ω be given. Players I and II play the I-game for X 2 × ω in the
following way. First, player I chooses i < 2, then player II chooses n and the play
is finished. Player I wins the play 〈i, n〉 if and only if 〈i, n〉 ∈ X .
We define: X is I-determinate in 2× ω, DetI2×ω(X), if and only if
∀c∃s ∈ 2× ω[s ∈II c ∧ s ∈ X ]→ ∃i < 2∀n[〈i, n〉 ∈ X ].
Theorem 9.4. BIM ⊢ ∀α[DetI2×ω(Dα)]↔ LLPO.
Proof. (i) Assume: ∀α[DetI2×ω(Dα)].
Let β be given. Define α such that
∀i < 2∀p[α(〈i, p〉) 6= 0↔ 2p+ i 6= µn[β(n) 6= 0]].
Let c be given. Calculate n := max
(
c(〈0〉), c(〈1〉)
)
and consider βn.
If ∀p[2p < n→ 2p 6= µn[β(n) 6= 0]], then 〈0, c(〈0〉)〉 ∈II c ∧ 〈0, c(〈0〉)〉 ∈ Dα,
and, if ∃p[2p < n ∧ 2p = µn[β(n) 6= 0]], then 〈1, c(〈1〉)〉 ∈II c ∧ 〈1, c(〈1〉)〉 ∈ Dα.
We thus see: ∀c∃s ∈ 2× ω[s ∈II c ∧ s ∈ Dα].
Using Det2×ω(Dα), conclude: ∃i < 2∀p[〈i, p〉 ∈ Dα].
Note: ∀i < 2[∀p[〈i, p〉 ∈ Dα]↔ ∀p[2p+ i 6= µn[β(n) 6= 0]].
Conclude: ∃i < 2∀p[2p+ i 6= µn[β(n) 6= 0]].
We thus see: ∀β∃i < 2∀p[2p+ i 6= µn[β(n) 6= 0]], that is: LLPO.
(ii) Assume LLPO.
Let α be given.
Assume: ∀c∃s ∈ 2× ω[s ∈II c ∧ s ∈ Dα].
Conclude: ∀m∀n[〈0,m〉 ∈ Dα ∨ 〈1, n〉 ∈ Dα].
Define β such that ∀i < 2∀p[β(2p+ i) 6= 0↔ α(〈i, p〉) = 0].
Using LLPO, find i < 2 such that ∀p[2p+ i 6= µn[β(n) 6= 0]].
Assume: ∃p[α(〈i, p〉) = 0]. Find p0 := µp[α(〈i, p〉) = 0]. Conclude: 〈i, p0〉 /∈ Dα
and ∀p[〈1 − i, p〉 ∈ Dα] and ∀p[α(〈1 − i, p〉) 6= 0] and ∀p[β(2p + 1 − i) = 0]. As
∀p[2p + i 6= µn[β(n) 6= 0]], we conclude: β = 0 and ∀p[〈i, p〉 ∈ Dα], in particular:
〈i, p0〉 ∈ Dα and α(〈i, p0〉) 6= 0. Contradiction.
We thus see: ∀p[α(〈i, p〉) 6= 0], that is: ∀p[〈i, p〉 ∈ Dα].
Conclude: ∀α[DetI2×ω(Dα)]. 
9.2.2. Infinitely many alternatives for player I.
Let X ⊆ ω× 2 be given. Players I and II play the I-game for X in ω× 2 in the
following way. First, player I chooses a natural number n, then player II chooses
a number i from {0, 1}. Player I wins the play 〈n, i〉 if and only if 〈n, i〉 ∈ X .
Note that a strategy for player I in such a two-move-game coincides with his first
move and thus is a natural number. A strategy for player II, on the other hand, is
an infinite sequence γ in C that expresses player II’s intention to play γ(〈n〉) once
player I has brought them to the position 〈n〉.
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We define: X ⊆ ω × 2 is I-determinate in ω × 2, DetIω×2(X), if and only if:
∀γ ∈ C∃s ∈ ω × 2[s ∈II γ ∧ s ∈ X ]→ ∃n∀i < 2[〈n, i〉 ∈ X ]
Theorem 9.5. BIM ⊢ ∀α[DetIω×2(Dα)].
Proof. Let α in C be given. Assume: ∀γ ∈ C∃n[〈n, γ(〈n〉)〉 ∈ Dα]. Find γ in C
such that ∀n[γ(〈n〉) = 1↔ 〈n, 0〉 ∈ Dα]. Find n such that 〈n, γ(〈n〉)〉 ∈ Dα. Note:
γ(〈n〉) = 1 and ∀i < 2[〈n, i〉 ∈ Dα]. 
A strategy for player I in ω × ω coincides with a first move for player I. Let
X ⊆ ω×ω be given. Consider the II-game for X in ω×ω. Let γ be given such that
∀n[〈n, γ(〈n〉)〉 ∈ X ]. Note that γ is a strategy for player II by which he wins the
II-game for X . We thus see: DetIIω×ω(X). Similarly, for every X ⊆ N, Det
II
2×ω(X)
and DetIIω×2(X).
9.2.3. Longer games. We also consider games in which players I, II make more than
one move. Which of those games are determinate from the viewpoint of Player I?
Because of Theorem 9.4, we restrict ourselves to games in which player I has, for
each one of his moves, countably many alternatives, whereas player II always has
to choose one of two possibilities.
For every n, for every X ⊆ (ω × 2)n, we define:
X is I-determinate in (ω × 2)n, Det(ω×2)n(X), if and only if
∀γ ∈ C∃s[s ∈II γ ∧ s ∈ X ])→ ∃b∀s ∈ (ω × 2)
n[s ∈I b→ s ∈ X ].
This definition extends in the obvious way to subsets X of (ω × 2)n × ω.
9.3. Infinitely many moves. We also want to consider games of infinite length.
We imagine players I, II to build together an infinite sequence δ in N , as follows.
First, player I chooses δ(0), then player II chooses δ(1), then player I chooses δ(2),
and so on.
We define a number of notions of determinacy.
X ⊆ (ω × 2)ω is I-determinate in (ω × 2)ω, DetI(ω×2)ω (X ), if and only if
∀γ ∈ C∃δ[δ ∈II γ ∧ δ ∈ X ]→ ∃β∀δ ∈ (ω × 2)
ω[δ ∈I β → δ ∈ X ].
X ⊆ (ω × 2)ω is finitely I-determinate in (ω × 2)ω, ∗DetI(ω×2)ω(X ) if and only if
∀γ ∈ C∃δ[δ ∈II γ ∧ δ ∈ X ]→ ∃b∀δ ∈ (ω × 2)
ω[δ ∈II b→ δ ∈ X ].
X ⊆ C is I-determinate in C, DetIC(X ), if and only if
∀γ ∈ C∃δ[δ ∈II γ ∧ δ ∈ X ]→ ∃β∀δ ∈ C[δ ∈I β → δ ∈ X ].
X ⊆ C is finitely I-determinate in C, ∗DetIC(X ), if and only if
∀γ ∈ C∃δ[δ ∈II γ ∧ δ ∈ X ]→ ∃b∀δ ∈ C[δ ∈I b→ δ ∈ X ].
X ⊆ C is II-determinate in C, DetIIC (X ), if and only if
∀γ ∈ C∃δ[δ ∈I γ ∧ δ ∈ X ]→ ∃β∀δ ∈ C[δ ∈II β → δ ∈ X ].
X ⊆ C is finitely II-determinate in C, ∗DetIIC (X ), if and only if
∀γ ∈ C∃δ[δ ∈I γ ∧ δ ∈ X ]→ ∃b∀δ ∈ C[δ ∈II b→ δ ∈ X ].
We are going to study the following statements:
Σ01-Det
I
ω×2: ∀α[Det
I(Eα)].
∆01-Det
I
ω×2×ω: ∀α[Det
I
ω×2×ω(Dα)].
∆01-Det
I
(ω×2)m : ∀α[Det
I
(ω×2)m(Dα)].
Σ01-Det
I
(ω×2)ω : ∀α[Det
I
(ω×2)ω (Gα)].
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Σ01-
∗DetI(ω×2)ω : ∀α[
∗DetI(ω×2)ω(Gα)].
Σ01-Det
I
C : ∀α[Det
I
C(Gα)].
Σ01-
∗DetIC : ∀α[
∗DetIC(Gα)].
Σ01-Det
I
C : ∀α[Det
II
C (Gα)].
Σ01-
∗DetIIC : ∀α[
∗DetIIC (Gα)].
Each of the above formulas X has the form: ∀α[P (α) → Q(α)]. For each of
these nine formulas X , we define the statement ¬!X , the strong negation of X , as
follows:
¬!X := ¬!
(
∀α[P (α)→ Q(α)]
)
:= ∃α[P (α) ∧ ¬Q(α)].
Note that the symbol ¬! is used as a metamathematical notation, not as part of
the language of BIM. One should also not consider ¬! as the name of a syntactical
operation on formulas.
Lemma 9.6. One may prove the following statements in BIM.
(i) Σ01-Det
I
ω×2 → Σ
0
1-
←−−−−
ACω,2 and ¬!(Σ01-
←−−−−
ACω,2)→ ¬!(Σ01-Det
I
ω×2).
(ii) ∆01-Det
I
ω×2×ω → Σ
0
1-Det
I
ω×2 and ¬!
(
Σ01-Det
I
ω×2
)
→ ¬!
(
∆01-Det
I
ω×2×ω
)
.
(iii) ∀m[∆01-Det
I
(ω×2)m ]→∆
0
1-Det
I
ω×2×ω and
¬!(∆01-Det
I
ω×2×ω
)
→ ∃m[¬!(∆01-Det
I
(ω×2)m)].
(iv) ∀m[Σ01-Det
I
(ω×2)ω →∆
0
1-Det
I
(ω×2)m ∧
¬!(∆01-Det
I
(ω×2)m)→ ¬!(Σ
0
1-Det
I
(ω×2)ω)].
(v) Σ0
1
-DetIC → Σ
0
1
-DetI(ω×2)ω and ¬!(Σ
0
1
-DetI(ω×2)ω )→ ¬!(Σ
0
1
-DetIC), and
Σ0
1
- ∗DetIC → Σ
0
1
- ∗DetI(ω×2)ω and ¬!(Σ
0
1-
∗DetI(ω×2)ω)→ ¬!(Σ
0
1-
∗DetIC).
(vi) Σ01-Det
II
C → Σ
0
1-Det
I
C and ¬!(Σ
0
1-Det
I
C)→ ¬!(Σ
0
1-Det
II
C ), and
Σ01-
∗DetIIC → Σ
0
1-
∗DetIC and ¬!(Σ
0
1-
∗DetIC)→ ¬!(Σ
0
1-
∗DetIIC ).
(vii) FT→ Σ01-
∗DetIIC and ¬!(Σ
0
1-
∗DetIIC )→ ¬!FT.
Proof. (i) We prove: for each α, there exists β such that
∀γ ∈ C∃n[
(
n, γ(n)
)
∈ Eα]→ ∀γ ∈ C∃n[〈n, γ(n)〉 ∈ Eβ ] and
∃n[〈n, 0〉 ∈ Eβ ∧ 〈n, 1〉 ∈ Eβ ]→ ∃n[(n, 0) ∈ Eα ∧ (n, 1) ∈ Eα].
The two promised conclusions then follow easily.
Let α be given. Define β such that ∀n∀i < 2[α(p) = (n, i) + 1 ↔ β(p) =
〈n, i〉+ 1] and ∀p[¬∃n∃i < 2[α(p) = (n, i) + 1]→ β(p) = 0]. Clearly, β satisfies the
requirements.
(ii) We prove: given any α, one may construct β such that
∀γ ∈ C∃n[〈n, γ(n)〉 ∈ Eα]→ ∀γ ∈ C∃n∃p[〈n, γ(n), p〉 ∈ Dβ ]
and:
∃n∀i < 2∃p[〈n, i, p〉 ∈ Dβ ]→ ∃n∀i < 2[〈n, i〉 ∈ Eα].
Given α, define β in C such that ∀n∀i < 2∀p[β(〈n, i, p〉) 6= 0 ↔ α(p) = 〈n, i〉 + 1].
Note ∀n∀i < 2[〈n, i〉 ∈ Eα ↔ ∃p[〈n, i, p〉 ∈ Dβ]], and: β satisfies the requirements.
The two promised conclusions now follow easily.
(iii) Note: ∆01-Det
I
(ω×2)2 →∆
0
1-Det
I
ω×2×ω and
¬!(∆01-Det
I
ω×2×ω
)
→ ¬!(∆01-Det
I
(ω×2)2).
(iv) Let m be given. We prove: given any α one may construct β such that
∀γ ∈ C∃s ∈ (ω × 2)m[s ∈II γ ∧ s ∈ Dα]→ ∀γ∃δ ∈ (ω × 2)
ω[δ ∈II γ ∧ δ ∈ Gβ ] and
∃γ∀δ ∈ (ω × 2)ω[δ ∈I γ → δ ∈ Gβ ]→ ∃c∀s ∈ (ω × 2)
m[s ∈I c→ s ∈ Dα].
The two promised conclusions then follow easily.
Let α be given. Define β in C such that ∀s[β(s) 6= 0↔
(
s ∈ ω2m ∧ α(s) 6= 0
)
].
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Observe that, if ∀γ ∈ C∃s ∈ (ω × 2)m[s ∈II γ ∧ s ∈ Dα], then
∀γ ∈ C∃δ ∈ C[δ ∈II γ ∧ β
(
δ(2m)
)
6= 0], that is: ∀γ∃δ ∈ C[s ∈II γ ∧ δ ∈ Gβ ].
Let γ be given such that ∀δ[(δ ∈I γ ∧ δII ∈ C)→ ∃n[β(δn) 6= 0]].
Conclude: ∀δ[(δ ∈I γ ∧ δII ∈ C)→ α
(
δ(2m)
)
6= 0].
Find N such that ∀s ∈
⋃
n≤2m ω
n[s ∈I γ → s < N ] and define c := γN .
Conclude: ∀s ∈ (ω × 2)m[s ∈I c→ s ∈ Dα].
(v) We prove: for each α, one may construct β such that
∀γ ∈ C∃δ ∈ (ω × 2)ω[δ ∈II γ ∧ δ ∈ Gα]→ ∀γ ∈ C∃δ ∈ C[δ ∈II γ ∧ δ ∈ Gβ ] and
∃ζ∀δ ∈ C[δ ∈I ζ → δ ∈ Gβ ]→ ∃ζ∀δ ∈ (ω × 2)
ω[δ ∈I ζ → δ ∈ Gα] and
∃z∀δ ∈ C[δ ∈I z → δ ∈ Gβ ]→ ∃z∀δ ∈ (ω × 2)
ω[δ ∈I z → δ ∈ Gα].
The promised conclusions then follow easily.
From the point of view of player I, a game in (ω × 2)ω may be simulated by a
game in Cantor space C. Where player I would play n in (ω × 2)ω, he will play n
times 0 and one time 1 in C. So he plays the finite sequence 0n∗ 〈1〉. Every time he
plays 0, we say he makes what we call a postponing move. Player II has to react,
in C, to these postponing moves of player I, but these reactions do not matter. As
soon as player I plays 1 and completes 0n ∗ 〈1〉, player II gives, in the play in C,
the answer he would give to player I’s move n in (ω× 2)ω. The reader should keep
this in mind when reading the following definitions.
Define ρ such that
1. ρ(〈 〉) := 〈 〉, and,
2. for each n, for each a in Bin2n, for both i < 2, ρ(a ∗ 〈0〉) = ρ(a ∗ 〈0, i〉) := ρ(a),
and ρ(a∗ 〈1〉) = ρ(a)∗ 〈p〉, where p satisfies: aI = 0p or ∃c[aI = c∗ 〈1〉 ∗ 0p], and,
for both i < 2, ρ(a ∗ 〈1, i〉) =
(
ρ(a) ∗ 〈1〉) ∗ 〈i〉.
Let α be given. Define β such that ∀a ∈ Bin [β(a) = α
(
ρ(a)
)
].
Assume: ∀γ ∈ C∃δ ∈ (ω × 2)ω[δ ∈II γ ∧ δ ∈ Gα], that is:
∀γ ∈ C∃s[s ∈II γ ∧ α(s) 6= 0].
Let γ in C be given as a strategy for player II in C. Define γ† in C as a strategy
for player II in (ω × 2)ω such that, for each s in
⋃
n(ω × 2)
n × ω, for each m, for
each a in Bin2m+1, if a(2m) = 1 and a ∈II γ and ρ(a) = s, then γ†(s) = γ(a).
Find s such that s ∈II γ† and α(s) 6= 0. Find a in Bin such that ρ(a) = s and
a ∈ γ. Conclude: β(a) = α(s) 6= 0.
We thus see: ∀γ ∈ C∃a ∈ Bin [a ∈II γ ∧ β(a) 6= 0].
Let ζ in C be given such that ζ is a winning strategy for player I in the game in
C for Gβ , that is: ∀δ ∈ C[δ ∈I ζ → ∃n[β(δn) 6= 0]]. We now define a strategy ζ∗ for
player I in (ω × 2)ω.
We will take care that, for all s in
⋃
n(ω × 2)
n, if s ∈I ζ∗ and ¬∃t ⊑ s[α(t) 6= 0],
then there exist n, a such that a ∈ Bin2n and a ∈I ζ and ∀i < n[aI(i) = a(2i) =
0→ aII(i) = a(2i+ 1) = 0] and ρ(a) = s.
We show how to define γ∗(s) for a given s in
⋃
n(ω × 2)
n such that s ∈I γ∗ and
distinguish two cases.
1. ∃t ⊑ s[α(t) 6= 0]. It is not important anymore how we define γ∗(s), as s is
already a winning position for player I in the game in (ω × 2)ω for Gα. We
define: γ∗(s) = 0.
2. ¬∃t ⊑ s[α(t) 6= 0]. Find n, a such that a ∈ Bin2n and a ∈I γ and a(2n − 2) =
aI(n − 1) = 1 and ∀i < n[aI(i) = a(2i) = 0 → aII(i) = a(2i + 1) = 0]
and ρ(a) = s. Find m, b such that a ⊏ b and b ∈I γ and b ∈ Bin2m+1 and
m = µi ≥ n[bI(i) = b(2i) = 1] and ∀i[n ≤ i < m→ bII(i) = b(2i+ 1) = 0].
Note that such b,m exist as γ is a winning strategy for player I in the game
in C for Gβ . Player I, playing in C from a onwards, follows ζ and assumes that
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player II is answering 0 to every postponing move of player I. There will a
moment that ζ forces him to play 1.
Define ζ∗(s) = m− n− 1.
Let δ in (ω×2)ω be given such that δ ∈I ζ∗. Find ε in C such that ∀m∃n[δm ⊑ ρ(εn)]
and ∀i[εI(i) = ε(2i) = 0 → εII(i) = ε(2i + 1) = 0]. Note: ε ∈I γ. Define
n := µp[β(εp) 6= 0]. Note: α
(
ρ(εp)
)
6= 0 and ρ(εp) ⊏ δ.
Conclude: ∀δ ∈ (ω × 2)ω[δ ∈I ζ∗ → ∃n[α(δn) 6= 0]].
Let z be given such that ∀δ ∈ C[δ ∈I z → ∃n[β(δn) 6= 0]]. Define z∗ such that,
for all n,m, for all s in (ω×2)n, for all a in Bin2m, if a < length(z) and ρ(a) = s and
aI(m−1) = a(2m−2) = 1 and ∀i < m[aI(i) = a(2i) = 0→ aII(i) = a(2i+1) = 0],
then s < length(z∗) and z∗(s) = z(a).
Conclude, as above: ∀δ ∈ (ω × 2)ω[(δ ∈I z∗ → ∃n[α(δn) 6= 0]].
(vi) We prove: for each α, there exists β such that:
∀γ ∈ C∃s ∈ Bin [s ∈I γ ∧ α(s) 6= 0]→ ∀γ ∈ C∃t ∈ Bin [t ∈II γ ∧ β(t) 6= 0] and :
∃ζ ∈ C∀δ ∈ C[δ ∈II ζ → ∃n[β(δn) 6= 0]]→ ∃ζ ∈ C∀δ ∈ C[δ ∈I ζ → ∃n[α(δn) 6= 0]]
and : ∃z∀δ ∈ C[δ ∈II z → ∃n[β(δn) 6= 0]]→ ∃z∀δ ∈ C[δ ∈I z → ∃n[α(δn) 6= 0]].
The promised conclusions then follow easily.
Let α be given. Define β in C such that β(0) = 0 and ∀s ∈ Bin[β(〈0〉 ∗ s) =
β(〈1〉 ∗ s) = α(s)].
Assume: ∀γ ∈ C∃s ∈ Bin [s ∈I γ ∧ α(s) 6= 0]. Let γ in C be given. Define γ†
such that ∀s ∈ Bin [γ†(s) = γ
(
〈γ(0)〉 ∗ s
)
]. Find s in Bin such that s ∈I γ† and
α(s) 6= 0. Note: 〈γ(0)〉 ∗ s ∈II γ and β
(
〈γ(0)〉 ∗ s
)
6= 0.
Conclude: ∀γ ∈ C∃t ∈ Bin[t ∈II γ ∧ β(t) 6= 0].
Let ζ in C be given such that ∀δ ∈ C[δ ∈II ζ → ∃n[β(δn) 6= 0]]. Define ζ∗ such
that, ∀s ∈ Bin [ζ∗(s) = ζ(〈0〉 ∗ s)]. Note: ∀δ ∈ C[δ ∈I ζ∗ → 〈0〉 ∗ δ ∈II ζ], so
∀δ ∈ C[δ ∈I ζ∗ → ∃n[β(〈0〉 ∗ δn) 6= 0]] and: ∀δ ∈ C[δ ∈I ζ∗ → ∃n[α(δn) 6= 0]].
Let z be given such that ∀δ ∈ C[δ ∈II z → ∃n[β(δn) 6= 0]]. Define z∗ such that,
∀s ∈ Bin [z∗(s) = z(〈0〉 ∗ s)].
Conclude, as above: ∀δ ∈ C[δ ∈I z∗ → ∃n[α(δn) 6= 0]].
(vii) We prove: for each α, there exists β such that
∀γ ∈ C∃s[s ∈I γ ∧ α(s) 6= 0]→ BarC(Dβ) and
∃m[BarC(Dβm)]→ ∃c∀δ ∈ C[δ ∈II c→ ∃n[α(δn) 6= 0]].
The two promised conclusions then follow easily.
Let α be given.
Define β such that ∀c ∈ Bin [β(c) 6= 0↔ ∃s < c[s ∈I c ∧ α(s) 6= 0]].
Assume ∀γ ∈ C∃s[s ∈I γ ∧ α(s) 6= 0].
Clearly, ∀γ ∈ C∃n[β(γn) 6= 0], that is: BarC(Dβ).
Let m be given such that BarC(Dβm).
Define X := {s ∈ Binm | ∃n ≤ m[α(sn) 6= 0]}. Note: ∀b∃s[s ∈I b ∧ s ∈ X ].
According to Theorem 9.3, DetIIBinm(X).
Find c such that ∀s ∈ Binm[s ∈II c→ s ∈ X ].
Conclude: ∀δ ∈ C[δ ∈II c → δm ∈ X ] and: ∀δ ∈ C[δ ∈II c → ∃n[α(δn) 6= 0]].
. 
Theorem 9.7. (i) BIM ⊢ Σ01-
←−−−−
ACω,2 ↔ Σ01-Det
I
ω×2 ↔∆
0
1-Det
I
ω×2×ω ↔
∀m[∆01-Det
I
(ω×2)m ]↔ Σ
0
1-Det
I
(ω×2)ω ↔ Σ
0
1-
∗DetI(ω×2)ω ↔ Σ
0
1-Det
I
C ↔
Σ01-
∗DetIC ↔ Σ
0
1-Det
II
C ↔ Σ
0
1-
∗DetIIC ↔ FT.
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(ii) BIM ⊢ ¬!(Σ01-
←−−−−
ACω,2)↔ ¬!(Σ01-Det
I
ω×2)↔ ¬!(∆
0
1-Det
I
ω×2×ω)↔
∃m[¬!(∆01-Det
I
(ω×2)m)]↔ ¬!(Σ
0
1-Det
I
(ω×2)ω)↔ ¬!(Σ
0
1-
∗DetI(ω×2)ω)↔
¬!(Σ01-Det
I
C)↔ ¬!(Σ
0
1-
∗DetIC)↔ ¬!(Σ
0
1-Det
II
C )↔ ¬!(Σ
0
1-
∗DetIIC )↔ ¬!FT.
Proof. Use Lemmas 5.3 and 9.6. 
9.4. The Intuitionistic Determinacy Theorem.
A (continuous) function ϕ : C → (ω × 2)ω is called an anti-strategy for player I
in (ω × 2)ω if and only if ∀γ ∈ C[ϕ|γ ∈II γ].
The Second Axiom of Continuous Choice, ACN ,N = AC1,1, implies:
for every subset X ⊆ (ω × 2)ω: if ∀γ ∈ C∃δ ∈ (ω × 2)ω[δ ∈II γ ∧ δ ∈ X ], then
∃ϕ : C → (ω × 2)ω∀γ ∈ C[ϕ|γ ∈II γ ∧ ϕ|γ ∈ X ].
X ⊆ (ω × 2)ω is weakly I-determinate in (ω × 2)ω, if and only if
∀ϕ : C×(ω×2)ω[∀γ ∈ C[ϕ|γ ∈II γ ∧ ϕ|γ ∈ X ]→ ∃β∀δ ∈ (ω×2)
ω[δ ∈I β → δ ∈ X ]].
ACN ,N implies: if X ⊆ (ω × 2)ω is weakly I-determinate in (ω × 2)ω, then X is
I-determinate in (ω × 2)ω.
Earlier versions of the next Theorem may be found in [28] and [38].
Theorem 9.8 (Intuitionistic Determinacy Theorem). The following statements are
equivalent in BIM:
(i) FT.
(ii) For every anti-strategy ϕ for player I in (ω× 2)ω there exists a strategy β for
player I in (ω × 2)ω such that ∀δ ∈ (ω × 2)ω[δ ∈I β → ∃γ ∈ C[δ = ϕ|γ]].
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii). Let ϕ : C → (ω× 2)ω be an anti-strategy for player I in (ω× 2)ω,
that is: ∀γ ∈ C[ϕ|γ ∈II γ].
We intend to develop a strategy β for player I in (ω × 2)ω that corresponds to
ϕ in the following sense. Player I, while obeying β, and developing, together with
player II, δ in (ω × 2)ω, will be able to construct a strategy γ for player II in
(ω× 2)ω such that δ = ϕ|γ. The infinite sequence δ thus is the answer given by the
anti-strategy ϕ to player II’s strategy γ. So, while playing δ, player I conjectures
a strategy γ that player II may be assumed to follow during this very play.
The construction of the strategy β takes eight steps.
(1). Let a, c be given such that aII ∈ Bin and c ∈ Bin. We define: with respect
to the given anti-strategy ϕ, c is, at the position a, a safe conjecture by player I
about the strategy followed by player II, notation: Safe(a, c), if and only if:
∀δ ∈ C∃s ∈ Bin [c ⊏ s ∧ as ⊏ δ ∧ a ⊑ ϕ|s].
Note: Safe(a, c)↔ ∀δ ∈ C∃γ ∈ C[c ⊏ γ ∧ aγ = δ ∧ a ⊏ ϕ|γ].
If Safe(a, c), then player I, having reached the position a, may extend every
conjecture δ on player II’s strategy at positions b such that a ⊑ b to a conjecture γ
about player II’s strategy at any position b such that γ passes through c and ϕ|γ
passes through a.
(2). We prove: for all a such that aII ∈ Bin , for all c ∈ Bin, one may decide:
Safe(a, c) ∨ ¬Safe(a, c).
One does so as follows. Let a such that aII ∈ Bin and c in Bin be given.
Define β such that ∀s[β(s) 6= 0↔
(
s ∈ Bin ∧ (a ⊑ ϕ|s ∨ a ⊥ ϕ|s)
)
].
Note: BarC(Dβ), and: ∀s[s ∈ Dβ → ∀i < 2[s ∗ 〈i〉 ∈ Dβ]].
Using FT, find n > length(c) such that Binn ⊆ Dβ .
Note: ∀s ∈ Binn[length(as) ≤ as ≤ s < n] and
Safe(a, c)↔ ∀d ∈ Binn∃s ∈ Binn[c ⊑ s ∧ as ⊑ d ∧ a ⊑ ϕ|s].
Clearly, one may decide the statement:
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∀d ∈ Binn∃s ∈ Binn[c ⊑ s ∧ as ⊑ d ∧ a ⊑ ϕ|s].
We define σ such that ∀a∀c[σ(a, c) 6= 0↔ Safe(a, c)], as follows.
First define ψ such that, for all a such that aII ∈ Bin , for all c in Bin ,
ψ(a, c) := µn[n > length(c) ∧ ∀d ∈ Binn[a ⊑ ϕ|d ∨ a ⊥ ϕ|d]],
and then define σ such that for all a, c,
σ(a, c) 6= 0↔
(c ∈ Bin ∧ aII ∈ Bin ∧ ∀d ∈ Binψ(a)∃s ∈ Binψ(a)[c ⊑ s ∧
as ⊑ d ∧ a ⊑ ϕ|s]).
We also define τ such that, for all a, c such that c ∈ Bin and aII ∈ Bin , if
¬Safe(a, c), then
τ(a, c) = µd[d ∈ Binψ(a) ∧ ¬∃s ∈ Binψ(a)[c ⊑ s ∧
as ⊏ d ∧ a ⊑ ϕ|s]].
Note that, if ¬Safe(a, c), then
∀δ[τ(a, c) ⊏ δ → ¬∃s ∈ Bin[as ⊏ δ ∧ c ⊑ s ∧ a ⊑ ϕ|s]].
(3). Let a, c be given such that aII ∈ Bin and length(a) is odd and c ∈ Bin and
Safe(a, c).
Player II has to make the next move. We want to show that, whatever he does,
c is still, at the resulting position, a safe conjecture for Player I about the strategy
followed by Player II.
Let j < 2 and δ in C be given. Find ε in C such that 〈j〉ε = δ and ε(〈 〉) = j.
Find s in Bin such that c ⊑ s and as ⊏ ε and a ⊏ ϕ|s. Conclude: a∗〈j〉s ⊏ δ and
a ∗ 〈j〉 ⊑ ϕ|s.
We thus see: for all a such that aII ∈ Bin and length(a) is odd, for all c ∈ Bin,
if Safe(a, c), then ∀j < 2[Safe(a ∗ 〈j〉, c)].
(4). Let a, c be given such that aII ∈ Bin and length(a) is even and c ∈ Bin and
Safe(a, c).
Player I has to make the next move. We want to show that he is able to reach,
possibly in several steps, a position at which he can extend the safe conjecture c to
a longer safe conjecture.
This conclusion will, be obtained at step (5). We first prove:
∀δ ∈ C∃u[u ∈II δ ∧ ∃i < 2[Safe(a ∗ u, c ∗ 〈i〉)]].
Let δ in C be given. Find s in Bin such that c ⊏ s ∧ as ⊏ δ ∧ a ⊑ ϕ|s.
Determine i such that c ∗ 〈i〉 ⊑ s. Define
C := {u | u ∈II
as ∧ u ≥ length(as) ∧ length(u) is odd}.
Assume ∀u ∈ C[¬Safe(ϕ, a ∗ u, c ∗ 〈i〉)].
Define δ∗ in C such that as ⊏ δ∗ and ∀u ∈ C[τ(a ∗ u, c ∗ 〈i〉) ⊏ u(δ∗)].
Find γ in C such that s ⊏ γ and aγ = δ∗ and consider ϕ|γ.
Note: a ⊏ ϕ|γ and find u in C such that a ∗ u ⊏ ϕ|γ.
Note: a∗uγ = u(δ∗) and τ(a ∗ u, c ∗ 〈i〉) ⊏ u(δ∗).
We know: ¬∃ζ ∈ C[a ∗ u ⊏ ϕ|ζ ∧ τ(a ∗ u, c ∗ 〈i〉) ⊏ a∗uζ].
Contradiction.
We conclude: ∃u ∈ C[Safe(ϕ, a ∗ u, c ∗ 〈i〉)] and
∀δ ∈ C∃u[u ∈II δ ∧ Safe(a ∗ u, c ∗ 〈i〉) ∧ length(u) is odd ].
Using (3), we conclude:
∀δ ∈ C∃u[u ∈II δ ∧ Safe(a ∗ u, c ∗ 〈i〉) ∧ u 6= 〈 〉 ∧ length(u) is even ].
(5). Let a, c be given such that aII ∈ Bin and length(a) is even and c ∈ Bin and
Safe(a, c). We shall prove: there exists b such that
∀d[(d > length(b) ∧ d ∈I b)→ ∃n[0 < 2n ≤ length(d) ∧∃i < 2[Safe(a∗d(2n), c∗〈i〉)]].
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First, using the result of (4) and Σ01- Det
I
(ω×2)ω , an equivalent of FT, see Theo-
rem 9.7(i), find β such that ∀δ[δ ∈I β → ∃n∃i < 2[Safe(a ∗ δ(2n+ 2), c ∗ 〈i〉)]].
Note that the set {δ ∈ (ω × 2)ω | δ ∈I β} is a fan.
Using FT, find m such that ∀δ[δ ∈I β → ∃n ≤ m∃i < 2[Safe(a ∗ δ(2n+2), c ∗ 〈i〉)]].
Find p such that ∀δ[δ ∈I β → δ(2m + 2) < p] and note that b := βp satifies the
requirements.
(6). We define A ⊆ N such that for all a, c, b, A(a, c, b) if and only if length(a) is
even and aII ∈ Bin , and c in Bin and
∀d[(d > length(b) ∧ d ∈I b)→ ∃n[0 < 2n ≤ length(d) ∧∃i < 2[Safe(a∗d(2n), c∗〈i〉)].
We define ρ such that ∀a∀c∀b[A(a, c, b)↔ ρ(a, c, b) 6= 0].
It is not difficult to see that ρ is well-defined.
(7). We now want to define a strategy β for player I in (ω × 2)ω such that
∀δ ∈ (ω × 2)ω[γ ∈I β → ∃γ ∈ C[δ = ϕ|γ]].
First, define λ such that λ(〈 〉) = 〈 〉, and, for all a in (ω × 2)<ω, for all 〈p, i〉 in
ω × 2, if there exists j < 2 such that Safe
(
a ∗ 〈p, i〉, λ(a) ∗ 〈j〉
)
, then λ(a ∗ 〈p, i〉) =
λ(a) ∗ 〈j0〉, where j0 is the least such j, and, if not, then λ(a ∗ 〈p, i〉) = λ(a).
Note: ∀a ∈ (ω × 2)<ω[Safe
(
a, λ(a)
)
].
Then, using (6), define η such that for all a in (ω × 2)<ω, for all c in Bin , if
Safe(a, c), then η(a, c) = µb[ρ(a, c, b) 6= 0].
Define β as follows. Let a be given.
If a /∈ (ω × 2)<ω, define β(a) = 0.
If a ∈ (ω × 2)<ω, define n0 := µn[Safe(a(2n), λ(a))], and find b such that a =
a(2n0) ∗ b. Define β(a) :=
(
η(a(2n0), λ(a))
)
(b).
(8). Let β be as defined in (7). Let δ be an element of (ω×2)ω such that δ ∈I β.
Note: ∀n[λ
(
δ(2n)
)
⊑ λ
(
δ(2n+ 2)
)
]. and: ∀m∃n > m[λ
(
δ(2n)
)
⊏ λ
(
δ(2n+ 2)
)
].
Find γ in C such that ∀n[λ
(
δ(2n)
)
⊏ γ]. Note: ∀n∃m ≥ n[Safe
(
δ(2m), γn)], and:
∀n∃ζ ∈ C[γn ⊏ ζ ∧ δ(2n) ⊏ ϕ|ζ]. Conclude: ϕ|γ = δ.
We thus see: ∀δ ∈ (ω × 2)ω[δ ∈I β → ∃γ ∈ C[ϕ|γ = δ]].
(ii) ⇒ (i). Assume (ii). We prove: Σ01-Detω×2. Using Theorem 9.7(ii), we then
may conclude: FT.
Let α be given such that ∀γ ∈ C∃n[〈n, γ(n)〉 ∈ Eα]. Define ψ : C → N such that
∀γ ∈ C[ψ(γ) = µp[α(p′) = 〈p′′, γ(p′′)〉 + 1]. Define ϕ : C → (ω × 2)ω such that
∀γ ∈ C[ϕ|γ = 〈ψ′′(γ), γ
(
ψ′′(γ)
)
〉 ∗ 0].
Find β such that ∀δ ∈ (ω × 2)ω[δ ∈I β → ∃γ ∈ C[δ = ϕ|γ]], and, therefore:
∀δ ∈ (ω × 2)ω[δ ∈I β → ∃q[α(q) = δ2 + 1]], that is:
∀δ ∈ (ω × 2)ω[δ ∈I β → δ2 ∈ Eα]. Define n := β(〈 〉) and note: 〈n, 0〉 ∈I β and
〈n, 0〉 ∈I β, and, therefore: ∀i < 2[〈n, i〉 ∈ Eα].
We thus see: ∀α[∀γ ∈ C∃n[〈n, γ(n)〉 ∈ Eα] → ∃n∀i < 2[〈n, i〉 ∈ Eα]], that is:
Σ01-Detω×2. 
Corollary 9.9. BIM + FT proves the following scheme:
Every X ⊆ (ω × 2)ω is weakly I-determinate.
The theorem and its corollary may be generalized. One may replace (ω× 2)ω by
any spread F satisfying the condition: ∃ζ∀α ∈ F∀n[α(2n− 1) ≤ ζ(n)].
Let ϕ : C → (ω × 2)ω be an anti-strategy for player I in (ω × 2)ω. We define: ϕ
fails to translate into a strategy for player I if and only if
¬∃β∀δ ∈ (ω × 2)ω[δ ∈I β → ∃γ ∈ C[δ = ϕ|γ]].
¬!FT implies the existence of an anti-strategy for player I in (ω× 2)ω that fails to
translate into a strategy for player I in (ω× 2)ω: using ¬!FT and Theorem 9.7(ii),
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find α such that ∀γ ∈ C∃n[〈n, γ(n)〉 ∈ Eα] and ¬∃n∀i < 2[〈n, i〉 ∈ Eα]. As in the
proof of Theorem 9.8(ii)⇒ (i), find an anti-strategy ϕ for player I in (ω× 2)ω such
that ∀γ ∈ C[(ϕ|γ)2 ∈ Eα]. Assume β is a strategy for player I in (ω × 2)ω such
that ∀δ ∈ (ω × 2)ω[δ ∈I β → ∃γ ∈ C[δ = ϕ|γ]]. Consider n := β(〈 〉) and conclude:
∀i < 2[〈n, i〉 ∈ Eα]. Contradiction.
We did not find an argument proving ¬!FT from the assumption of the existence
of an anti-strategy for player I in (ω× 2)ω that fails to translate into a strategy for
player I in (ω × 2)ω.
10. The (uniform) intermediate value theorem
10.1. The Intermediate Value Theorem, IVT:
For all ϕ in R[0,1],
if ∃γ ∈ [0, 1]2[ ϕ(γ0) ≤R 0R ≤R ϕ(γ1)], then ∃γ ∈ [0, 1][ϕ(γ) =R 0R].
IVT fails constructively. The next two theorems are similar to [3, Chapter 3,
Theorem 2.4] and [25, Theorem 6(iv) and (iii)].
Theorem 10.1. BIM ⊢ IVT→ LLPO.
Proof. Assume IVT. Let β be given.
Define δ in R such that, for each n, if n < µp[β(p) 6= 0], then δ(n) = (− 12n ,
1
2n ),
and, if n ≥ p0 := µp[β(p) 6= 0], then δ(n) = (−1)p0
1
2p0+1
− 12n+3 , (−1)
p0 1
2p0+1
+ 12n+3 ).
Note: δ >R 0R ↔ ∃p[2p = µn[β(n) 6= 0]] and
δ <R 0R ↔ ∃p[2p+ 1 = µn[β(n) 6= 0]].
Find ϕ in R[0,1] such that ϕ(0R) =R (−1)R, ϕ(
1
3 ) =R ϕ(
2
3 ) =R δ and ϕ(1R) =R
1R and ϕ is linear on [0,
1
3 ], on [
1
3 ,
2
3 ] and on [
2
3 , 1].
Note: ϕ(0R) ≤R 0R ≤R ϕ(1R). Using IVT, find γ in [0, 1] such that ϕ(γ) =R
0R. Note: either γ >R
1
3 or γ <R
2
3 . If γ >R
1
3 , then ¬(δ >R 0) and: ∀p[2p 6=
µn[β(n) 6= 0]], and, if γ <R
2
3 , then ¬(δ <R 0) and: ∀p[2p+ 1 6= µn[β(n) 6= 0]].
We thus see: ∀β[∀p[2p 6= µn[β(n) 6= 0]] ∨ ∀p[2p + 1 6= µn[β(n) 6= 0]], that is
LLPO. 
Theorem 10.2. BIM +Π01-ACω,2 ⊢ LLPO→ IVT.
Proof. Let ϕ in R[0,1] and γ in [0, 1]2 be given such that ϕ(γ0) ≤R 0R ≤R ϕ(γ1).
Define β such that, for all n, β(2n) 6= 0 ↔ γ0(n) <S γ
1(n) and: β(2n + 1) 6= 0 ↔
γ1(n) <S γ
0(n). Using LLPO, we decide: either: ∀p[2p + 1 6= µn[β(n) 6= 0]] and
∀n[γ0(n) ≤S γ1(n)] and γ0 ≤R γ1 or: ∀p[2p 6= µn[β(n) 6= 0]] and ∀n[γ1(n) ≤S
γ0(n)] and γ1 ≤R γ
0.
Assume γ0 ≤R γ1. Using LLPO like we used it just now, conclude: ∀n∀m ≤
2n[ϕ(2
n−m
2n ·R γ
0 +R
m
2n ·R γ
1) ≤R 0R ∨ 0R ≤R ϕ(
2n−m
2n ·R γ
0 +R
m
2n ·R γ
1)].
Using Π01-ACω,2, find β such that β
0(0) = 0 and β0(1) 6= 0 and
∀n∀m ≤ 2n[βn(m) = 0→ ϕ(2
n−m
2n ·R γ
0 +R
m
2n ·R γ
1) ≤R 0R], and
∀n∀m ≤ 2n[βn(m) 6= 0→ 0R ≤R ϕ(
2n−m
2n ·R γ
0 +R
m
2n ·R γ
1)].
Now define δ such that δ(0) = 0 and
∀n[βn+1
(
2δ(n) + 1
)
6= 0→ δ(n+ 1) = 2δ(n)], and
∀n[βn+1
(
2δ(n) + 1
)
= 0→ δ(n+ 1) = 2δ(n) + 1].
Note: ∀n[δ(n) < 2n ∧ βn
(
δ(n)
)
= 0 ∧ βn
(
δ(n) + 1
)
6= 0] and
∀n[ϕ( δ(n)2n ) ≤R 0R ≤R ϕ(
δ(n)+1
2n )].
Define ε such that, for each n, ε(n) = ( δ(n)2n ,
δ(n)+1
2n ) and define γ such that, for
each n, γ(n) = doubleS
(
ε(n)
)
. Note: γ ∈ R.
Assume ϕ(γ) >R 0R.
Find n, p such that p ∈ Eϕ and γ(n) ⊑S p′ and (p′′)′ >Q 0Q.
Note γ′(n) <Q
δ(n)
2n <Q γ
′′(n) and ϕ( δ(n)2n ) ≤R 0R. Contradiction.
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Conclude: ϕ(γ) ≤R 0R.
For a similar reason, 0R ≤R ϕ(γ) and: ϕ(γ) =R 0R.
The case γ1 ≥R γ0 is treated similarly. 
Corollary 10.3. BIM+Π01-ACω,2 ⊢ IVT↔ LLPO↔WKL.
Proof. Use Theorems 2.4, 4.2, 10.1 and 10.2. 
10.2. A contraposition of the Intermediate Value Theorem,
←−−
IVT:
For each ϕ in R[0,1], if ∀γ ∈ [0, 1][φ(γ) #R 0R], then
either ∀γ ∈ [0, 1][φ(γ) >R 0R] or ∀γ ∈ [0, 1][φ(γ) <R 0R].
Theorem 10.4. BIM ⊢
←−−
IVT.
Proof. Assume ϕ ∈ R[0.1] and ∀γ ∈ [0, 1][ϕ(γ) #R 0R]. Assume: ϕ(0R) <R 0R.
Suppose: γ ∈ [0, 1] and ϕ(γ) >R 0R. We will find a contradiction by the method
of successive bisection.
Find q in Q such that ϕ(qR) >R 0Q. Define δ as follows, by induction. First,
δ(0) := (0, q). Let n, s be given such that δ(n) = s. Note: ϕ( s
′+Qs
′′
2 ) # 0R. Find
(r, t) in Eϕ such that r
′ <Q
1
2 (s
′ +Q s
′′) <Q r
′′ and either : 0Q <Q t
′ or : t′′ <Q 0Q.
If 0Q <Q t
′, define δ(n + 1) = (s′, s
′+Qs
′′
2 ), and, if t
′′ <Q 0Q, define δ(n + 1) =
( s
′+s′′
2 , s
′′). Note that, for each n, δ(n + 1) ⊑S δ(n), and ϕ
(
δ′(n)
)
<R 0R <R
ϕ
(
δ′′(n)
)
. Define δ∗ such that, for all n, δ∗(n) = doubleS
(
δ(n)
)
. Note: δ∗ ∈ [0, 1]
and ϕ(δ∗) #R 0R. Determine (r, s) in Eϕ and n in N such that δ
∗(n) ⊏S r and:
either s′′ <Q 0 or 0 <Q s
′. Note: δ(n) ⊏ δ∗(n) and conclude: either ϕ
(
δ′(n)
)
<R 0R
and ϕ
(
δ′′(n)
)
<R 0R, or: ϕ
(
δ′(n)
)
>R 0R and ϕ
(
δ′′(n)
)
>R 0R. Contradiction.
From ¬
(
ϕ(γ) >R 0R
)
and ϕ(γ) #R 0R, we conclude: ϕ(γ) <R 0R.
We thus see: ϕ(0R) <R 0R → ∀γ ∈ [0, 1][ϕ(γ) <R 0R].
In the same way, one proves: ϕ(0R) >R 0R → ∀γ ∈ [0, 1][ϕ(γ) >R 0R]. 
10.3. FT is unprovable in BIM+ IVT. As we observed in Subsection 4.8, BIM+
CT+X ∨ ¬X is consistent. We just saw: BIM ⊢
←−−
IVT, and, therefore: BIM+X ∨
¬X ⊢ IVT. Assume BIM ⊢ IVT → FT. Then BIM +X ∨ ¬X ⊢ FT. But, as we
know from Theorem 2.1, BIM+CT ⊢ ¬!FT, and, therefore, BIM+CT ⊢ ¬FT.
Conclude: BIM+IVT 0 FT, and also, in view of Theorem 2.2, BIM+IVT 0WKL.
Note that, in view of Corollary 10.1, this gives another proof of BIM 0 Π01-ACω,2,
a fact established in Subsection 4.8.
10.4. The Uniform Intermediate Value Theorem, UIVT:
For each ϕ such that ∀n[ϕn ∈ R[0,1]],
if ∀n∃γ ∈ [0, 1]2[ ϕn(γ0) ≤R 0R ≤R ϕn(γ1)], then ∃γ ∈ [0, 1]N∀n[ϕn(γn) =R 0R].
In [23, Exercise IV.2.12, page 137], the reader is asked to prove that, in RCA0,
UIVT is an equivalent of WKL. As RCA0 ⊢ IVT, RCA0 proves the equivalence
of UIVT and:
10.5. Uzero:
For all ϕ such that ∀n[ϕn ∈ R[0,1]],
if ∀n∃γ ∈ [0, 1][ ϕn(γ) =R 0R], then ∃γ ∈ [0, 1]N∀n[ϕn(γn) =R 0R].
We want to study Uzero in BIM. We need the following Lemma.
Lemma 10.5. BIM proves:
(i) ∃ψ : N → N∀ϕ ∈ R[0,1][Hψ|ϕ = {γ | ϕ|γ #R 0R}], and
(ii) ∃τ : N → N∀α[τ |α ∈ R[0,1] ∧ Hα = {γ ∈ [0, 1] | (τ |α)(γ) #R 0R}].
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Proof. Define ψ : N → N such that, for each ϕ, for each s,
(ψ|ϕ)(s) 6= 0↔ ∃p < s∃v∃w[s ⊏S v ∧ (v, w) ∈ Eϕs ∧ (0Q <Q w
′ ∨ w′′ <Q 0Q)].
Note: ∀ϕ ∈ R[0,1]∀γ ∈ [0, 1][ϕ|γ #R 0R ↔ γ ∈ Hψ|ϕ].
Now define ρ such that, for each s in S, ρs ∈ R[0,1] and, for all γ in [0, 1],
(1) if γ ≤R s′ or s′′ ≤R γ, then ρs(γ) =R 0R, and,
(2) if s′ ≤R γ ≤R s′′, then ρs(γ) =R inf(γ −R s′, s′′ −R γ).
Define τ : N → N such that, for all α, τ |α ∈ R[0,1] and, for each γ in [0, 1],
(τ |α)(γ) =R
∑
s,α(s) 6=0
1
2s ·R ρ
s(γ).
Note: ∀γ ∈ [0, 1][γ ∈ Hα ↔ (τ |α)(γ) # R0R], and:
∀γ ∈ [0, 1][γ /∈ Hα ↔ (τ |α)(γ) =R 0R]. 
Theorem 10.6. BIM ⊢ Π01-ACω,[0,1] ↔ Uzero.
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii). Assume Π01-ACω,[0,1].
Let ϕ be given such that ∀n[ϕn ∈ R[0,1] ∧ ∃γ ∈ [0, 1][ϕn(γ) =R 0R]]. Using
Lemma 10.5(i), find α such that, ∀n[Hαn = {γ ∈ [0, 1] | ϕn(γ) #R 0R}]. Conclude:
∀n∃γ ∈ [0, 1][γ /∈ Hαn ] and, by Π01-ACω,[0,1]: ∃γ ∈ [0, 1]
N∀n[γn /∈ Hαn ] and:
∃γ ∈ [0, 1]N∀n[φn(γn) =R 0R].
Conclude: Uzero.
(ii) ⇒ (i). Assume Uzero.
Let α be given such that ∀n∃γ ∈ [0, 1][γ /∈ Hαn ]. Using Lemma 10.5(ii), find
ϕ such that ∀n[ϕn ∈ R[0,1]] and ∀n[Hαn = {γ ∈ [0, 1] | φn(γ) #R 0R}]. Con-
clude: ∀n∃γ ∈ [0, 1][ϕn(γ) =R 0R], and ∃γ ∈ [0, 1]
N∀n[ϕn(γn) =R 0R], and
∃γ ∈ [0, 1]N∀n[γn /∈ Hαn ].
Conclude: Π01-ACω,[0,1]. 
10.6. A uniform contrapositive Intermediate Value Theorem
←−−−−
UIVT :
For each ϕ such that ∀n[ϕn ∈ R[0,1]], if ∀γ ∈ [0, 1]N∃n[ϕn(γn) #R 0R],
then ∃n[∀γ ∈ [0, 1][ϕn(γ) >R 0R] ∨ ∀γ ∈ [0, 1][ϕn(γ) <R 0R]].
As BIM ⊢
←−−
IVT, BIM proves the equivalence of
←−−−−
UIVT and:
10.7.
←−−−−
Uzero:
For all ϕ such that ∀n[ϕn ∈ R[0,1]],
if ∀γ ∈ [0, 1]N∃n[ϕn(γn) #R 0R], then ∃n∀γ ∈ [0, 1][ϕ
n(γ) #R 0R].
We also define a strong negation of this statement:
10.8. ¬!
←−−−−
Uzero:
There exists ϕ such that ∀n[ϕn ∈ R[0,1]] and ∀γ ∈ [0, 1]N∃n[ϕn(γn) #R 0R] and
¬∃n∀γ ∈ [0, 1][ϕn(γ) #R 0R].
Lemma 10.7. One may prove in BIM:
(i) Σ01-
←−−−−−−
ACω,[0,1] →
←−−−−
Uzero and ¬!
←−−−−
Uzero → ¬!Σ01-
←−−−−−−
ACω,[0,1].
(ii)
←−−−−
Uzero→ Σ01-
←−−−−−−
ACω,[0,1] and ¬!Σ
0
1-
←−−−−−−
ACω,[0,1] → ¬!
←−−−−
Uzero
Proof. (i) We prove, in BIM: for all ϕ such that ∀n[ϕn ∈ R[0,1]], there exists β such
that
∀γ ∈ [0, 1]N∃n[ϕn(γn) #R 0R]→ ∀γ ∈ [0, 1]
N∃n[γn ∈ Hβn ] and
∃n[[0, 1] ⊆ Hβn ]→ ∃n∀γ ∈ [0, 1][ϕ
n(γ) #R 0R].
The two promised conclusions then follow easily.
Let ϕ be given such that ∀n[ϕn ∈ R[0,1]] and ∀γ ∈ [0, 1]N∃n[ϕn(γn) #R 0R]].
Using Lemma 10.5 find β such that ∀n[Hβn = {γ ∈ [0, 1] | φn(γ) #R 0R}].
Conclude: ∀γ ∈ [0, 1]N∃n[γn ∈ Hβn ].
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Now let n be such that [0, 1] ⊆ Hβn . Clearly, ∀γ ∈ [0, 1][ϕn(γ) #R 0R].
(ii) We prove, in BIM: for each α, there exists ϕ such that ∀n[ϕn ∈ R[0,1]] and
∀γ ∈ [0, 1]N∃n[γn ∈ Hαn ]→ ∀γ ∈ [0, 1]
N∃n[ϕn(γn) #R 0R] and
∃n∀γ ∈ [0, 1][ϕn(γ) #R 0R])→ ∃n[[0, 1] ⊆ Hαn ].
The two promised conclusions then follow easily.
Let α be given. Using Lemma 10.5(ii), find ϕ such that
∀n[ϕn ∈ R[0,1] ∧ Hαn = {γ ∈ [0, 1] | ϕn(γ) #R 0R]].
Assume: ∀γ ∈ [0, 1]N∃n[γn ∈ Hαn ]. Conclude: ∀γ ∈ [0, 1]N∃n[ϕn(γn) #R 0R].
Now assume: ∃n∀γ ∈ [0, 1][ϕn(γ) #R 0R]. Conclude: ∃n[[0, 1] ⊆ Hαn ]. 
Theorem 10.8. BIM proves
←−−−−
Uzero↔
←−−−−
UIVT↔ FT and
¬!
←−−−−
Uzero↔ ¬!
←−−−−
UIVT↔ ¬!FT.
Proof. Use Lemma 10.7 and Theorem 7.2. 
11. The compactness of classical propositional logic
In this Section, we prove that FT is equivalent to a contraposition of a restricted
version of the compactness theorem for classical propositional logic. We prove also
the corresponding result for ¬!FT.
We introduce the symbols ¬,
∧
and
∨
as natural numbers: ¬ := 1,
∧
:= 2
and
∨
:= 3. We define (the characteristic function of) Form ⊆ N, as follows, by
recursion: for each n, n ∈ Form if and only if
n′ = 0 ∨ (n′ = ¬ ∧ n′′ ∈ Form) ∨
(
(n′ =
∧
∨ n′ =
∨
) ∧ ∀i < length(n)[n(i) ∈ Form ]
)
.
Assume γ ∈ C. We define γ˜ in C such that, for every n in Form,
(i) if n /∈ Form , then γ˜(n) = 0, and,
(ii) if n ∈ Form and n′ = 0, then γ˜(n) = γ(n′′), and,
(iii) if n ∈ Form and n′ = ¬, then γ˜(n) = 1− γ˜(n′′), and,
(iv) if n ∈ Form and n′ =
∧
, then γ˜(n) = min{γ˜
(
n′′(i)
)
|i < length(n′′)}, and
(v) if n ∈ Form and n′ =
∨
, then γ˜(n) = max{γ˜
(
n′′(i)
)
|i < length(n′′)}.
Note: 0 = 〈 〉. We define min(∅) = 1 and max(∅) = 0 and, therefore: γ˜
(
(
∧
, 0)
)
=
γ˜(⊤) = 1 and γ˜
(
(
∨
, 0)
)
= γ˜(⊥) = 0.
Assume c ∈ Bin . We define c˜ in Bin such that length(c) = length(c˜), as follows.
First, define γ = c ∗ 0. Then define, for all m < length(c), c˜(m) := γ˜(m).
X ⊆ N is realizable, Real(X), if and only if ∃γ ∈ C∀n ∈ X [γ˜(n) = 1], and
positively unrealizable, Unreal(X), if and only if ∀γ ∈ C∃n ∈ X [γ˜(n) = 0].
We define a mapping Fm from Bin to Form, as follows. Assume a ∈ Bin . Find
s such that length(s) = length(a), and, for all i < length(a), if a(i) = 0, then
s(i) = (¬, (0, i)), and, if a(i) = 1, then s(i) = (0, i). Define Fm(a) = (
∧
, s).
Lemma 11.1.
(i) ∀a ∈ Bin∀γ ∈ C[γ˜
(
Fm(a)
)
= 1↔ a ⊏ γ].
(ii) ∀α∃δ∀m[δ(m) ∈ Form ∧ ∀γ ∈ C[γ˜
(
δ(m)
)
= 1]↔ ∀n ≤ m[α(γn) = 0]]].
Proof. (i) The proof is by induction on length(a). Clearly, the statement holds if
a = 0 = 〈 〉.
Let a, n be given such that ∀γ ∈ C[γ˜
(
Fm(a)
)
= 1 ↔ a ⊏ γ] and length(a) = n.
Note that for each γ in C, for each i < 2,
γ˜
(
Fm(a ∗ 〈0〉)
)
= 1↔
(
γ˜
(
Fm(a
)
= 1 ∧ γ(n) = i
)
↔ a ∗ 〈i〉 ⊏ γ.
(ii) Let α,m be given.
Find t such that {t(i)|i < length(t)} = {a ∈ Binm | ∀n ≤ m[α(an) = 0]}.
Then find s such that length(s) = length(t) and ∀i < length(s[s(i) = Fm
(
t(i)
)
].
Define δ(m) = (
∨
, s).
Note that, for each γ in C, for each m, γ˜
(
δ(m)
)
= 1↔
∃a ∈ Binm[∀n ≤ m[α(an) = 0] ∧ γ˜
(
Fm(a)
)
= 1]↔
∃a ∈ Binm[∀n ≤ m[α(an) = 0] ∧ a ⊏ γ]↔ ∀n ≤ m[α(γn) = 0].

Theorem 11.2. The following statements are equivalent in BIM.
(i) WKL.
(ii) ∀α[∀n[Real(Eαn)]→ Real(Eα)].
(iii) ∀α[∀n[Real(Dαn)]→ Real(Dα)].
Proof. (i)⇒(ii). It suffices to prove, in BIM: for each α, there exists β such that
∀n[Real(Eαn)]→ ∀m[¬BarC(Dβm)] and
∃γ ∈ C∀n[β(γn) = 0]→ Real(Eα).
Let α be given. Define β in C such that
∀c ∈ Bin [β(c) = 0↔ ∀n < length(c)[n ∈ Eαm → c˜(n) = 1]].
Assume: ∀n[Real(Eαn)]. Let m be given. Find c in Binm such that ∀n <
m[n ∈ Eαm → c˜(n) = 1]. Note: c > m and ∀n ≤ m[β(cn) = 0] and, therefore,
¬BarC(βm).
Assume: γ in C and, for all n, β(γn) = 0. Note: ∀n∀m[(n < m ∧ n ∈ Eαm
)
→
γ˜(n) = 1]. Conclude: γ realizes Eα and: Real(Eα).
(ii) ⇒ (iii). This step is obvious as ∀α∃β[Dα = Eβ ].
(iii) ⇒ (i). It suffices to prove, in BIM: for each α, there exists β such that
∀m[¬BarC(Dαm)]→ ∀n[Real(Dβn)] and
Real(Dβ)→ ∃γ ∈ C∀n[α(γn) = 0]].
Let α be given. Using Lemma 11.1, find δ such that
∀m[δ(m) ∈ Form ∧ ∀γ ∈ C[γ˜
(
δ(m)
)
= 1↔ ∀n ≤ m[α(γn) = 0]]].
Note: ∀γ ∈ C∀m[γ˜
(
δ(m+ 1)
)
= 1→ γ˜
(
δ(m)
)
= 1].
Define β such that ∀m[β(m) 6= 0↔ ∃n[m = δ(n)]].
Assume: ∀m[¬BarC(Dαm)]. Then ∀m∃a ∈ Binm∀n ≤ m[α(an) = 0]. Conclude:
∀m∃γ ∈ C[γ˜
(
δ(m)
)
= 1] and: ∀n[Real(Dβn)].
Assume: Real(Dβ). Find γ in C realizing Dβ . Note: ∀m[γ˜
(
δ(m)
)
= 1] and:
∀m∀n ≤ m[α(γn) = 0] and: ∀n[α(γn) = 0] . 
Lemma 11.3. The following statements are provable in BIM.
(i) FT→ ∀α[Unreal(Eα)→ ∃n[Unreal(Eαn)]] and
∃α[Unreal(Eα) ∧ ∀n[Real(Eαn)]]→ ¬!FT.
(ii) ∀α[Unreal(Dα)→ ∃n[Unreal(Dαn)]]→ FT and
¬!FT→ ∃α[Unreal(Dα) ∧ ∀n[Real(Dαn)]].
Proof. (i)⇒(ii). It suffices to prove, in BIM: for each α, there exists β such that
Unreal(Eα)→ BarC(Dβ) and
∃m[BarC(Dβm)]→ ∃n[Unreal(Eαn].
Let α be given. Define β such that, for all c in Bin,
β(c) 6= 0↔ ∃n < length(c)[n ∈ Eαlength(c) ∧ c˜(n) = 0]].
Assume: Unreal(Eα). Let γ in C be given. Find n, p such that n ∈ Eαp and
γ˜(n) = 0. Define m := max{n, p} and note: β(γm) 6= 0. Conclude: BarC(Dβ)].
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Let m be given such that BarC(Dβm). For all c in Binm, ∃n ≤ m[β(cn) 6= 0],
and, therefore: β(c) 6= 0, and ∃n < length(c)[n ∈ Eαm ∧ c˜(n) = 0]. Conclude:
Unreal(Eαm) and ∃n[Unreal(Eαn)].
(ii) It suffices to prove, in BIM: for each α, there exists β such that
BarC(Dα)→ Unreal(Dβ) and
∃n[Unreal(Dβn)]→ ∃m[BarC(Dαm)].
Let α be given. Using Lemma 11.1, find δ such that
∀m[δ(m) ∈ Form ∧ ∀γ ∈ C[γ˜
(
δ(m)
)
= 1]↔ ∀n ≤ m[α(γn) = 0]]].
Define β such that ∀m[β(m) 6= 0↔ ∃n[m = δ(n)]].
Assume: BarC(Dα). Given any γ ∈ C, find m such that α(γm) 6= 0 and,
therefore, γ˜
(
δ(m)
)
= 0 and: ∃n ∈ Dβ[γ˜(n) 6= 1]. Conclude: Unreal(Dβ).
Assume: ∃n[Unreal(Dβn]. Find n such that Unreal(Dβn). Let m0 be the largest
m such that δ(m) < n. Note: ¬∃γ ∈ C[γ˜
(
δ(m0)
)
= 1], and, therefore, ∀a ∈
Binm0+1∃n ≤ m0[α(an) 6= 0], that is: BarC(Dα(m0+1)). 
Theorem 11.4. (i) BIM ⊢ FT↔ ∀α[Unreal(Eα)→ ∃n[Unreal(Eαn)]]
↔ ∀α[Unreal(Dα)→ ∃n[Unreal(Dαn)]].
(ii) BIM ⊢ ¬!FT↔ ∃α[Unreal(Eα) ∧ ∀n[Real(Eαn)]]↔
∃α[Unreal(Dα) ∧ ∀n[Real(Dαn)]].
Proof. Use Lemma 11.3 and: ∀α∃β[Dα = Eβ ]. 
Theorem 11.4(i) also is a consequence of [18, Theorem 6.5].
V.N. Krivtsov has shown, among other things, that FT is an equivalent of an
intuitionistic (generalized) completeness theorem for intuitionistic first-order pred-
icate logic, see [16].
12. A stronger Fan Theorem?
12.1. KL and WKL.
In the classical context of RCA0, one studies two extensions of WKL,
Bounded Ko¨nig’s Lemma BKL:
∀β∀α[
(
ExplFan(β) ∧ ∀n[¬BarFβ (Dαn)]
)
→ ∃γ ∈ Fβ∀n[α(γn) = 0]],
and: Ko¨nig’s Lemma KL:
∀β∀α[
(
Fan(β) ∧ ∀n[¬BarFβ(Dαn)]
)
→ ∃γ ∈ Fβ∀n[α(γn) = 0]].
BKL is, in RCA0, equivalent to WKL, see [23, Lemma IV.1.4]. KL, on the other
hand, is definitely stronger than WKL, as RCA0 +KL is equivalent to ACA0
5.
Note: BIM+Weak-Π01-ACω,ω proves FT ↔ ∀β[Fan(β) → ∀α[BarFβ (Dα) →
∃m[BarFβ (Dαm)]], and the axiom Weak-Π
0
1-ACω,ω is weak indeed
6, as the an-
tecedent is read constructively.
Searching for a statement that would be able to play, in the intuitionistic context,
a roˆle comparable to the roˆle of KL in the classical context, we came to study some
notions more general than the notion of a fan, or finitary spread. The expression
“finitely branching” occurring in the “finitely branching trees” mentioned in Ko¨nig’s
Lemma, should not be taken too constructively.
5One may study KL and WKL also in the constructive context of BIM although KL and
WKL are constructively meaningless, see our comment at the end of Subsection 2.3. One may
learn from [15, Theorem 9.20] that, using Weak -Π0
1
-ACω,ω, one may derive KL fromWKL.
6
BIM+ACω,ω! ⊢ Weak-Π01-ACω,ω .
41
12.2. The Almost-Fan Theorem.
We define [ω]ω := {ζ | ∀n[ζ(n) < ζ(n+ 1)]}.
For each α, Dα := {n | α(n) 6= 0} is finite if and only if ∃n∀m ≥ n[α(m) = 0]
and almost-finite if and only if ∀ζ ∈ [ω]ω∃n[α
(
ζ(n)
)
= 0].
Almost-finite decidable subsets of N were introduced in [30] and [31], and are
also studied in [35]. Every finite subset of N is almost-finite. The statement ‘Every
almost-finite decidable subset of N is finite’ implies LPO and thus is false:
Let α be given. Define β such that ∀n[β(n) 6= 0↔ n = µp[α(p) 6= 0]].
Note that Dβ is almost-finite. Assume Dβ is finite.
Find n such that ∀m ≥ n[β(m) = 0].
Either ∃m < n[β(m) 6= 0] and ∃m[α(m) 6= 0] or ∀m < n[β(m) = 0] and
∀m[α(m) = 0]. We thus see: ∀α[∃m[α(m) 6= 0] ∨ ∀m[α(m) = 0], that is: LPO.
Let β be given. β is an almost-fan-law, notation: Almfan(β), if and only if
Spr(β) and ∀s∀ζ ∈ [ω]ω∃n[β
(
s∗ 〈ζ(n)〉
)
6= 0]. F ⊆ N is called an almost-fan if and
only if ∃β[AlmFan(β) ∧ F = Fβ].
The Almost-Fan Theorem ALMFAN, first appearing in [33] and [34], is the
following scheme:
∀β[AlmFan(β)→(
BarFβ (B)→ ∃α[Dα ⊆ B ∧ ∀ζ ∈ [ω]
ω∃n[α ◦ ζ(n) = 0] ∧ BarFβ (Dα)]
)
There is a restricted version, AlmFT:
∀β∀α[
(
Almfan(β) ∧ BarFβ (Dα)
)
→
∃γ[Dγ ⊆ Dα ∧ ∀ζ ∈ [ω]ω∃n[γ ◦ ζ(n) = 0] ∧ BarFβ (Dγ)]].
Like the Fan Theorem, the Almost-Fan-Theorem is a consequence of Brouwer’s
Thesis on Bars in N . (For Brouwer’s Thesis on Bars, see [36] and [37].)
12.3. The Approximate-Fan Theorem. For each m, we define [ω]m := {s |
length(s) = m ∧ ∀i < m− 1[s(i) < s(i+ 1)]}. Let α be given. The set Dα := {n |
α(n) 6= 0} is bounded-in-number if and only if ∃m∀s ∈ [ω]m∃i < m[α
(
s(i)
)
= 0].
Every finite subset of N is bounded-in-number. The statement ‘Every decidable
subset of N that is bounded-in-number is finite’ implies LPO and thus is false:
Let α be given. Define β such that ∀n[α(n) 6= 0↔ n = µp[α(p) 6= 0]]. Note that
Dβ has at most one element and thus is bounded-in-number. Assuming Dβ is finite
we obtain the conclusion: ∃m[α(m) 6= 0] ∨ ∀m[α(m) = 0]], as in Subsection 12.2.
We thus conclude: LPO.
Every decidable subset of N that is bounded-in-number is almost-finite.
The statement ‘Every almost-finite decidable subset of N is bounded-in-number’
implies LPO and thus is false:
Let α be given. Define β such that
∀n[β(n) 6= 0↔ µp[α(p) 6= 0]] ≤ n ≤ 2 · µp[α(p) 6= 0]].
Note that Dβ is almost-finite. Assume Dβ is bounded-in-number. Find m such
that ∀s ∈ [ω]m∃i < m[α
(
s(i)
)
= 0]. Conclude: ∀n[n = µp[α(p) 6= 0]→ n ≤ m].
Either ∃n ≤ m[α(n) 6= 0] or ∀n < m[α(n) = 0] and ∀n[α(n) = 0]. We thus see:
∀α[∃n[α(n) 6= 0] ∨ ∀n[α(n) = 0], that is: LPO.
Decidable subsets of N that are bounded-in-number are introduced and discussed
in [30].
Let β be given. β is an approximate-fan law, notation: Appfan(β), if and only
if Spr(β) and ∀n∃m∀s ∈ [ω]m∃i < m[β
(
s(i)
)
6= 0 ∨ length
(
s(i)
)
6= n], that is,
for each n, the set {t|β(t) = 0 ∧ length(t) = n} is bounded-in-number. β is an
explicit approximate-fan law, notation: ExplAppfan(β), if and only if Spr (β) and
∃γ∀n∀s ∈ [ω]γ(n)∃i < γ(n)[β
(
s(i)
)
6= 0 ∨ length
(
s(i)
)
6= n]. F ⊆ N is an (explicit)
approximate fan if and only if ∃β[(Expl)Appfan(β) ∧ F = Fβ ].
Using Weak -Π01-ACω,ω, one may prove: ∀β[Appfan(β)→ ExplAppfan(β)].
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Let β be a spread-law. The condition: ∀t∃m[∀s ∈ [ω]m∃i < m[β
(
t ∗ 〈s(i)〉
)
6= 0],
that is: for each t, the set of the immediate prolongations of t that are approved of
by the spread-law β is bounded-in-number is weaker than the condition: ∀n∃m[∀s ∈
[ω]m∃i < m[β
(
s(i)
)
6= 0 ∨ length
(
s(i)
)
6= n] and would have been too weak for our
purposes. The reason is the following. Assume that we know that β satisfies this
latter condition. One then may calculate n such that the set
A := {s | length(s) = 1 ∧ β(s) = 0} has at most n elements. For each s in A one
may calculate m such that the set As := {s | length(t) = 2 ∧ s ⊏ t ∧ β(t) = 0}
has at most m elements. But, as long as not all members of A are known, one will
be unable to calculate p such that the set B := {s | length(s) = 2 ∧ β(s) = 0} has
at most p elements.
Note that every approximate fan is an almost-fan. If we confine the statement of
ALMFAN to Explicit Approximate Fans, we obtain the Unrestricted Approximate-
Fan Theorem APPFAN, that we sometimes call the Unrestricted Strong Fan The-
orem STRONGFAN:
∀β[ExplAppFan(β)→(
BarFβ (B)→ ∃α[Dα ⊆ B ∧ ∀ζ ∈ [ω]
ω∃n[α ◦ ζ(n) = 0] ∧ BarFβ (Dα)]
)
There is a restricted version, AppFT:
∀β∀α[
(
Appfan(β) ∧ BarFβ (Dα)
)
→
∃γ[Dγ ⊆ Dα ∧ ∀ζ ∈ [ω]ω∃n[γ ◦ ζ(n) = 0] ∧ BarFβ (Dγ)]].
12.4. In BIM, AppFT has a number of important equivalents, see [41]. BIM
proves that AppFT is equivalent to the following principle of Open Induction:
OI([0, 1]) : ∀α[∀δ ∈ [0, 1][[0, δ) ⊆ Hα → δ ∈ Hα]→ [0, 1] ⊆ Hα].
BIM proves AppFT → FT, but not: FT → AppFT. AlmFT seems to be
slightly stronger than AppFT.
The relation between WKL and KL in RCA0 may be compared to the relation
between FT and AppFT in BIM. We avoid the acronym WFT.
There is a constructive version of Weak Weak Ko¨nig’s Lemma WWKL, see [23,
Definition X.1.7], that is called WWFT, see [21].
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